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HOW DOES LOSS IN REPUTATION AFFECT FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES? 
CROSS-BORDER EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN LOAN SYNDICATION 
MARKETS 
 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The objective of this thesis is to study how does loss in reputation affect lead 
arrangers’ subsequent syndication activity in the European loan syndication markets. 
Specifically, I study if the defaults and restructurings of borrowers cause reputational 
consequences for the lead arrangers. Furthermore, I study if the reputational effects 
are more pronounced in cross-border lending, where there are potentially more 
information asymmetries present. I also study how the lender-borrower distance 
affects syndication choice.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLY 
 
The dataset includes over 11 000 syndicated loan transactions in Europe from 1999 to 
2011. I am also able to acquire information on 202 loan defaults and restructurings, 
which consists of 643 separate loans. To test the hypotheses, I estimate several panel 
regressions (OLS) where I also include fixed effect controls.   
 
RESULTS 
 
The empirical results of this thesis show that on European level lead arrangers retain 
lower share of the subsequent loans they syndicate in their balance sheet. I establish a 
connection between lead arranger’s signalling propensity and shocks to reputation 
and show, that lead arranger retain larger share of the subsequent loans if the 
syndicate has high foreign participation. 
 
I also find that lead arrangers signal better monitoring quality as the distance between 
lender and borrower increases. Further, I find that following borrower defaults, lead 
arrangers’ ability to attract small participants is damaged. Instead, the lead arrangers 
seem to switch to larger participants in their future syndicates 
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KUINKA MAINEEN MENETYS VAIKUTTAA RAHOITUKSENVÄLITTÄJIIN? 
TODISTUSAINEISTOA EUROOPAN SYNDIKOITUJEN LAINOJEN 
MARKKINOILTA 
 
 
TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
 
Tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia, kuinka rahoituksenvälittäjän maineen menetys 
vaikuttaa sen tuleviin lainasyndikointeihin. Erityisenä tavoitteenani on tutkia 
aiheuttavatko lainanottajien lainojen laiminlyönnit tai uudelleenjärjestelyt seurauksia 
syndikaatin pääjärjestäjille. Lisäksi tutkin, kuinka etäisyys lainaajan ja lainanottajan 
välillä vaikuttaa maineen menetyksen seurauksiin. 
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
 
Empiirinen aineisto käsittää yli 11 000 syndikoitua lainatransaktiota Euroopassa 
vuosina 1999 - 2011. Aineisto käsittää lisäksi 202 maksun laiminlyöntiä ja 
uudelleenjärjestelyä, jotka koostuvat yhteensä 643 erillisestä lainasta. Hypoteeseja 
tutkiessani estimoin useita kiinteiden vaikutusten paneeliregressioita (OLS).  
 
TULOKSET 
 
Empiirinen osioni osoittaa, että lainanottajien lainamaksujen laiminlyönnit tai 
uudelleenjärjestelyt vaikuttavat suuresti pääjärjestäjien tuleviin lainasyndikointeihin. 
Tutkimukseni mukaan pääjärjestäjät pitävät taseessaan pienemmän osuuden 
tulevaisuudessa syndikoimistaan lainoista. Tulos viittaa riskiaversiivisuuden kasvuun 
lainanottajien vaikeuksien myötä. 
 
Tutkimukseni osoittaa lisäksi yhteyden ulkomaisten syndikaattiosallistujien ja 
pääjärjestäjän signalointihalukkuuden välillä. Ulkomaisten osallistujien osuuden 
kasvaessa, pääjärjestäjän halukkuus mitigoida maineen menetyksestä koituvia 
kustannuksia signaloimalla kasvaa. Pääjärjestäjät signaloivat parempaa monitorointia 
pitämällä suuremman osuuden syndikoimistaan lainoista taseissaan. Tutkimus 
osoittaa lisäksi, että pääjärjestäjän kyky hankkia pieniä osallistujia vaikeutuu maineen 
menetyksen myötä.      
 
AVAINSANAT 
 
Syndikoidut lainat, informaatioasymmetriat, monitorointi, rahoituksenvälittäjien 
maine, Euroopan syndikoitujen lainojen markkinat 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background and motivation 
Screening and monitoring of borrowers is considered one of the core responsibilities of 
banks. In syndicated loan markets, the role of the arranging bank, or lead manager, is to 
monitor the firm on behalf of the other syndicate members. A large theoretical literature 
suggests that the bank has an incentive to conduct the monitoring well in order to mitigate 
existing agency conflicts. Poor screening and monitoring, and failure to mitigate the agency 
conflicts can lead to loss in reputation and future economic rents.  
Many of the most famous cases of monitoring failures have revolved around the Enron 
bankruptcy, which lead to default of its syndicated loans. During the aftermath, Austrian 
bank Raiffeisen claimed that Enron’s problems were being hid from it prior to joining the 
syndicate led by the Royal Bank of Scotland1. Although a London court ruled otherwise in 
2010, it is likely that the perception of RBS’ ability to conduct diligent monitoring suffered.   
Although theoretically the role and importance of an intermediary’s reputation is well 
established, the empirical work on how markets discipline monitoring failures is limited. 
Previous empirical research in the area include Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011), who 
found that Chapter 11 filings by borrowers adversely affect the future syndication activity 
of lead arrangers.  
However, the empirical work on the effectiveness of reputation-based disciplining methods 
has concentrated on the US loan market. The role of reputation remains untested in cross-
border setting, an area where information asymmetries are of utmost importance. Pan-
European lending activity has been growing since the adoption of the Euro, and foreign 
banks acts as the deal arranger in one third of the deals syndicated in the area (see e.g. 
Cabral, Dierick and Vesala (2002) or Haselmann and Wachtel (2011)).     
Despite the growing importance of the area, the reputational considerations of the matter 
remain largely untouched by academics. In this study, I aim to fill the gap in the literature 
by examining the role of reputation in cross-border syndicated lending.  
                                                   
1
 See “RBS Didn't Mislead Raiffeisen on Participation in Enron Loan, Judge Rules” in Bloomberg, June 
11, 2010. 
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1.2. Research question and contribution  
The loan syndication market provides an ideal platform to test how loss of reputation affects 
financial intermediaries and agency conflicts within syndicates. The syndicate includes a 
lead arranger responsible for originating the loan and participant lenders that fund parts of 
the loan. The screening and monitoring of a prospective borrower is delegated to the lead 
arranger. Agency conflicts are borne out of the fact that lead arranger only retains part of 
the loan, while conducting majority of the arrangement and monitoring tasks. Therefore, 
inadequate monitoring by the lead arranger can lead to losses for the whole syndicate. 
Previous literature suggests that inability to mitigate these agency conflicts will cause the 
lead arranger to suffer a loss of reputation. 
My aim is to complement the work by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011) and 
investigate if failure in monitoring has reputation related adverse effects on the leading 
financial institutions in the syndicate. Specifically, I investigate if the evidence from 
European loan markets supports the findings in the U.S. market by Gopalan, Nanda and 
Yerramilli (2011). I use data on European syndicated loan market since the adoption of the 
common currency, from 1999 to 2011. According to my knowledge, there are no previous 
researches conducted with European data on the role of reputation. 
Further, I also aim to shed new light on the role of reputation in syndicated lending by 
studying how the reputation-based disciplining methods work in cross-border setting. 
Although loan syndication is a global phenomenon, there is little prior research conducted 
on the role of reputation. Foreign banks usually have less local and market specific 
information, and they have to overcome cultural and bureaucratic barriers (Mian, 2006). 
These factors are likely to increase the importance of reputation as a diligent monitor.  
My research question is thus two-fold: 
(1) How does loss in reputation affect lead arrangers subsequent syndication 
activity in European loan syndication markets? 
(2) Are the reputational effects more pronounced in cross-border lending?  
1.3. Research objectives 
Following Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011) I study how shocks to the intermediaries’ 
reputation affect their position within future syndicates. Specifically, I study how defaults 
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or distressed restructurings2 affect the lead arranger’s subsequent syndication activity. Since 
the purpose of screening and monitoring is to assess the creditworthiness of a borrower, a 
default or a distressed restructuring of a borrower’s loan suggest that the monitoring has 
failed. I use these default events as a proxy for reputational shock, and study if they have 
reputation related consequences.  
Secondly, partly due to the integration of the European loan markets, financial institutions 
are increasingly engaging in frequent cross-border lending across the European countries 
(Haselmann and Wachtel, 2011). Although the marketplace is becoming more integrated, 
the differences between national economies cause the differences in the operating 
environment in each country. Furthermore, financial institutions from Asia, Middle-East 
and Northern America are also present in the European loan markets, further pronouncing 
the international nature of the business. 
To understand how these cross-border considerations and the international actors affect the 
role of reputation, I look at the importance of lender-borrower distance. The lender-
borrower distance is important in understanding the functioning of the market. Due to the 
informational, cultural and regulatory barriers between different markets, there potentially 
exist higher agency conflicts when some of the syndicate members are foreign. As the 
potential information asymmetries become more pronounced, the role of reputation is likely 
to become increasingly important. Natural question therefore is if an increase in lender-
borrower distance increases the reputational consequences. 
I aim to investigate this by creating a novel measure of the lender-borrower distance 
designed to proxy the informational, cultural and regulatory barriers that exist between the 
lender and the borrower. As an additional proxy, I also utilise the geographical distance as 
between the lender and the borrower. Through these measures I study what is the role of 
distance between the actors and does an increase in distance increase the consequences of 
reputational shocks. 
Further, I also compliment the findings by Lin et al. (2012) who found that lead arrangers 
with lower reputation have fewer foreign participants in their syndicates. In my study, I find 
out if shocks to lead arrangers’ reputation cause them to have fewer foreign participants in 
their subsequent syndicates. Finally, I investigate if the lead arrangers have a greater 
                                                   
2
 The data provider divides default events to defaults and distressed restructurings. Credit rating agencies 
consider these both as default events. For simplicity, in the research I will use the term default event to 
refer both defaults and restructurings.   
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incentive to signal better monitoring quality if they have more foreign participants in their 
syndicate. 
1.4. Scope and limitations of the thesis 
This thesis and its results are mainly limited by the quality of dataset used. Due to the 
amount of different countries and bankruptcy codes, default data on European level is 
scarce. Default data on syndicated loans is obtained from the Leveraged Commentary & 
Data portal operated by Standard & Poor’s. From the database I am able to acquire a total of 
202 cases of loan default or restructurings from 2000 to 2011. I adjust the length of the 
study period by the default data available. Therefore, the data on European syndicated loans 
covers years between 1999 and 2011, and it is obtained from Thomson Reuters SDC 
Platinum.  
The scope is also limited by the available data on lead allocation, the main dependent 
variable used in the thesis. I am only able to obtain the variable for 3385 arranging 
institutions, which is little over 10% of the total sample. The database also lacks 
information on loan pricing which is used in the reference study by Gopalan, Nanda and 
Yerramilli (2011). Despite the shortcomings of the data, my results are statistically 
significant and robust to alternative explanations.  
1.5. Main findings 
I find contradictory results compared to the earlier research by Gopalan, Nanda and 
Yerramilli (2011), who found that Chapter 11 filings by borrowers cause their lead 
arrangers to retain larger fraction on the subsequent loans they syndicate. Their findings 
suggest that lead arrangers are effectively indicating better monitoring quality by retaining 
larger share of the loan.  
My findings suggest that on European level, shocks to lead arrangers’ reputation by default 
events do not cause reputational consequences. Based on my findings, lead arrangers retain 
lower share of the subsequent loans after their borrowers experience default event. This 
suggests that arranging institutions have lower risk appetite after one of their borrower 
defaults. The effect is statistically significant at 1% and robust after controlling borrower, 
lender and year fixed effects and inclusion of several control variables.  
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I also investigate if the results hold for the various markets inside Europe. My findings 
suggest that banks domiciled in Nordic countries in fact signal better monitoring quality by 
increasing their lead allocation after experiencing default event. Effectively, this means that 
the domicile or market on which the lead arranger operates has an effect on the signalling 
propensity of the lead arrangers. The effect is statistically significant at 1% level. 
Related to the previous finding, I am also able to distinguish a new channel that affects the 
signalling propensity. Based on my results, the signalling propensity by lead arrangers 
following borrower defaults depends on the share of foreign participants in a syndicate. As 
the level of foreign syndicate participants increases, lead arrangers retain higher share of the 
loans they syndicate.  
This finding supports earlier literature that states that leads with lower reputation have 
fewer foreign participants in their syndicates. Therefore, as lead arrangers experience 
reputational shocks, they have higher incentives to mitigate them by retaining a higher share 
of loans with high foreign participation. The effect is statistically significant at 1% level. 
According to my knowledge, there are no previous studies that have identifies this effect.  
I also find that the lead arrangers signal better monitoring quality by including additional 
co-lead arrangers after experiencing shocks to their reputation. The effect is confined only 
to lead arrangers who are not in a dominant market position. This finding supports earlier 
literature that did not found reputational consequences to apply for dominant lead arrangers. 
Secondly, an increase in lender-borrower distance also causes lead arrangers to have 
additional co-leads in future syndicates. This suggests that as the information asymmetries 
grow in lender-borrower distance, banks have greater incentive to mitigate them by 
including additional lead arrangers in the syndicate.  
Finally, I find that lead arrangers ability to attract small participants is damaged after 
reputational shocks. Instead, the lead arrangers seem to switch to larger participants in their 
future syndicates. This suggests that perceived reputation loss is greater with small 
participants that are not active in syndication markets.  
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1.6. Structure of the study 
After introducing the study in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework for 
the study, and outlines the main hypothesis. Chapter 3 discusses the data and methodology 
used in the research. Chapter 4 covers the empirical findings and Chapter 5 concludes.  
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2. Literary review 
This section provides an introduction to the theoretical framework of syndicated loans, 
screening and monitoring and reputation of financial intermediaries. First, I lay out the 
concept of syndicated loans and the syndication process. I then discuss the recent 
development in the European loan market. Thirdly, I discuss the concept of screening and 
monitoring and how it relates to the agency conflicts found in syndicate structures. I also 
discuss the theoretical relationship between screening and monitoring, default events and 
intermediary reputation. Finally I formulate hypothesis for the empirical part of the study. 
2.1. Syndicated loans 
Syndicated loans are issued to a single borrower jointly by a group of lenders. They are 
hybrid instruments which combine features of traditional relationship lending and publicly 
traded debt. Syndicate lending allows risk sharing between the syndicate members, but does 
not require disclosure responsibilities as in bond issues (Gadanecz, 2004).  
Members of the syndicate roughly fall in to two categories. At minimum, the syndicate 
consists of one or more lead arrangers that the borrower has mandated to arrange and 
promote the loan to potential participants. The lead arrangers are responsible for negotiating 
and structuring of the transaction, as well as inviting participant members in joining the 
syndicate (Gadanecz, 2004; Altunbaş, Kara and Marques-Ibanez, 2010). Participant 
member usually do not negotiate directly with the borrower and have more distant 
relationship with it (Sufi, 2005). 
Potential syndicate members compete for the lead arranger’s role as it earns a large share of 
the fees paid up front (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001) Compared to bilateral lending, 
syndicated lending allows limiting the exposure to a single borrower while earning fees for 
arranging the transaction. While the participant members are usually paid only loan margin 
on their share, the structure allows them to gain exposure to certain geographical areas or 
industries without the need to have large lending department (Gadanecz, 2004). If there are 
several lead arrangers in a syndicate, they usually have competitive advantage in various 
duties, or they possess specific knowledge of a certain marketplace or industry (François 
and Missonier-Piera, 2007).  
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2.2. Syndication process and secondary market 
The syndication process starts when one financial institution is awarded the mandate to act 
as a lead arranger. The lead arranger drafts and signs a preliminary loan agreement that 
specifies loan amount, covenants, fees, collateral etc. The lead arranger then provides 
information on the transaction to potential participants and invites them to fund part of the 
loan. (Sufi, 2005) 
There are three different types of syndications: best-efforts syndication, underwritten deal 
and a club deal. In an underwritten deal the lead arrangers guarantees the entire loan and 
syndicates the loan to participant members after closing (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000). In 
best-efforts syndication, the arrangers do no fully guarantee the loan amount. If not enough 
additional subscribers are found, the borrower may have to accept a lower amount or the 
deal is cancelled. Finally, club deals are usually pre-marketed to a group of banks with a 
close relationship with the borrower. The arrangers are usually treated equally and they all 
receive same share of the fees (Standard & Poor's, 2012). 
The lead arranger provides the participants with an information memorandum, which 
contains information on the borrower and projections for the future. The lead also 
negotiates the loan terms with potential participants and drafts the loan documentation. 
Once enough participants have agreed to finance the loan, all of the syndicate members sign 
the final loan documentation. After the loan contract is signed, a lending contract is 
established between each lender and the borrower. All participants are treated equally and 
they all have the same loan terms and conditions. (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000) 
The figure below illustrates the syndicate structure.  
Figure I – Syndicate structure 
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2.2.1. History of syndicated lending 
The syndicated lending market was born already in the 1970s when it was mainly a tool for 
small financial institutions to acquire exposure in emerging markets without having to 
establish a local presence. Since the 1990s the syndicated loan market has grown strongly 
and now accounts to a significant portion of the total financing acquired by companies. 
Increase in the sophistication of the lending practices has led to creation of a secondary 
market and attracted a wider range of participant members ranging from pension institutions 
to CLOs3 (Altunbaş, Kara and Marques-Ibanez, 2010). 
Syndicated loans are the main alternative to bond financing, since both markets can allow 
firms to tap large amounts of funds with varying maturities (Altunbaş, Kara and Marques-
Ibanez, 2010). According to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) syndicated loans are nowadays 
mainly used for general corporate purposes and debt repayment, whereas in the 1980s 
syndicated loans were mainly used to finance mergers and acquisitions and leveraged 
buyouts.   
2.2.2. European syndicated loan market  
Debt financing has been the most important source of external financing in Europe with 
syndicated loans and corporate bonds forming 94% of all the public funds raised in 
European markets according to Altunbaş, Kara and Marques-Ibanez (2010).      
The syndicated loan market in Europe has seen tremendous growth from 1990s. According 
to Altunbaş, Kara and Marques-Ibanez (2010) this is explained mostly by creation of a 
regulated and standardised secondary market which has increased the liquidity. Further, an 
increasing amount of syndicated loans have been rated by independent credit agencies, 
leading to transparency and recognition.  
The importance of cross-border perspective is highlighted by Haselmann and Wachtel 
(2011) who find that since 1995 over 70% of all syndicated loans done in Europe have 
involved foreign participation. According to Cabral, Dierick and Vesala (2002) and Tsai, 
Chang and Hsiao (2011) foreign banks use syndicated loans to establish market presence 
and banking relationships. 
                                                   
3
 CLOs, or collateralized loan obligations, are structured finance vehicles that primarily invest in loans 
made to speculative-grade companies (Standard & Poor's, 2012). 
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European loan market is also characterised by differences in banking regulation, despite 
efforts to harmonise the regulation in the area (Fidrmuc and Hainz, 2012). They find that 
information asymmetries are magnified in the European loan markets due to differences in 
regulation across countries. However, their models shows that the differences in regulation 
can also induce cross-border lending if the regulation is unfavourable to domestic banks, 
and it does not involve foreign banks (Fidrmuc and Hainz, 2012). 
2.3. Screening and monitoring 
Information asymmetries and the role of monitoring are studied by Diamond (1984) who 
argues that monitoring of borrowers is most efficient when concentrated to a single party. 
According to his study, monitoring efforts by multiple creditors leads to increased costs and 
free-riding problems. At the same time, delegated monitoring can lead to moral hazard 
issues between the party conducting the monitoring and the other creditors. 
The issues of moral hazard in delegated monitoring exist mainly because the activities of 
the monitor are unobservable. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) showed that the uninformed 
investors are willing to invest only if the monitor has taken large enough financial interest 
in the borrower. Since the screening and monitoring efforts cannot be observed, the only 
way for the lead arranger to signal diligent monitoring is to retain a share of the loan.  
The work by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) has been complement in relation to syndicated 
lending by François and Missonier-Piera (2007) and Sufi (2007) who found that lead 
arrangers retain a larger share of the loan when the borrowers are opaque. Effectively, lead 
arrangers signal better monitoring quality by retaining share of the loan. Their study also 
found that in presence of greater information asymmetries, the syndicate structures are more 
concentrated and the lead arranger tends to choose participant with closer geographical 
proximity.  
Banks’ screening incentives have been questioned with respect to originate-to-distribute 
business model, where lead arrangers sell their exposure completely in the secondary 
market. It has been argued, that loan sales decrease banks’ incentives to conduct diligent 
monitoring as the ability to sell opaque loans to secondary market reduces the rewards from 
screening. In their study, Bester, Gehrig and Stenbacka (2012) find evidence that the 
marginal benefit of identifying profitable loans by screening are greater than avoiding bad 
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ones by loan sales. This suggests that banks’ screening incentives are intact even in 
originate-to-distribute business model. 
The degree of signalling is also affected by the debt contracting value of the borrower’s 
accounting information. Ball, Bushman and Vasvari (2008) find that as the ability of 
accounting figures to capture the changes in credit condition increases, the lead arranger 
holds smaller share of the loan on its balance sheet. According to their study, accounting 
information is an important channel in mitigating the information asymmetries within the 
syndicate. They argue that its relative influence is affected by possible credit rating, the 
reputation of the lead arranger or the previous relationship between the lead and the 
borrower. 
The lead allocation is also related to the spread required by the participant members. 
Ivashina (2009) finds that increase in the share retained by the lead arranger decreases the 
spread required by participants on their exposure. Their findings provide direct evidence 
that increase in the lead arranger’s share of the loan mitigates the inherent agency conflicts 
within the syndicate.  
The role of multiple lead arrangers, or co-leads, in a syndicate has been studied by François 
and Missonier-Piera (2007). They find evidence of two different roles for co-leads which 
are not mutually exclusive. According to the study, co-leads can have administrative duties 
motivated by cost reduction goals. Secondly, they find evidence of monitoring hypothesis, 
whereby co-leads monitor the lead arranger on behalf of the participant members. This role 
therefore consists of mitigating potential agency conflicts within a syndicate. 
2.3.1. Lead arranger reputation 
My research is related to the existing literature concerning financial intermediary 
reputation. Fang (2005) finds that more reputable underwriters obtain lower yields and are 
able to charge higher fees in the bond underwriting market. She also identifies strong 
evidence of a certificate effect, or quality stamp, that reputable underwrites convey to 
investors. Ross (2010) finds that this certification effect is stronger with dominant lead 
arrangers. He finds that dominant banks have strong market share partly due to the self-
reinforcing nature of a good reputation in monitoring. 
Earlier studies have established a clear theoretical link between intermediaries’ monitoring 
activities and reputation. Fang (2005) discusses the reputation capital which is vital for 
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financial intermediaries as they engage in repeated interaction between other market 
participants. Bad performance of an underwriter damages reputation and may cause loss of 
future income.  
Despite the theoretical linkages between reputation and monitoring, there is little empirical 
evidence on how lead arrangers and other market participants react to loss in reputation. 
Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli, (2011) found evidence of reputational consequences 
caused by shocks to reputation in the U.S syndication markets. According to their study, 
bankruptcy filings by borrowers cause lead arranger convey more diligent monitoring 
quality in their subsequent syndications. They also found that loss in reputation damages 
lead arrangers’ ability to attract participants in future syndicates. 
Related literature on the reputational consequences of defaults include (Dahiya, Saunders 
and Srinivasan, 2003) who found that the leading lending bank in a syndicate experiences a 
negative announcement return if a major borrower experiences a default event.  
2.4. Lender-borrower distance   
The role of lender-borrower distance has traditionally been studied with respect to small 
business lending, or banking in developing markets (e.g, see (Buch, 2005; Degryse and 
Ongena, 2005; Petersen and Rajan 2002)). The geographical distance between lender and 
borrower can be viewed as a proxy for the informational costs that exist between the 
counterparties of a lending transaction. The geographical proximity allows banks to easily 
acquire private information about the firms they do business with. By having an easy access 
to information, the bank with a close proximity to its clients is able to acquire market power 
over its competitors. (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) 
Related study by Buch (2005) studies the foreign assets and liabilities of commercial banks 
of five countries and finds that distance is an important determinant of foreign banking 
activities. Despite the improvements in information technology, the importance of distance 
on the foreign asset holdings has not changed and foreign banks still exhibit significant 
home bias in their portfolios.  
Previous studies have used geographical distance as a proxy for informational asymmetries 
or familiarity. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that geographical distance is an important 
determinant of portfolio choice by U.S. money managers. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) 
find that familiarity measured by language, culture and distance is an important determinant 
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of stockholdings by Finnish investors. They also find that these effects are inversely related 
to the investor sophistication.  
Related strand of literature examines the cultural differences between lender and borrower. 
The area with respect to syndicated loans has been studied by Giannetti and Yafeh (2012). 
They find that lenders offer more conservative loan terms to culturally distant borrowers 
and consider them riskier. This effect is persistent even after continuous interaction between 
the counterparties. They also find that cultural distance between participant bank and lead 
arranger worsens the participant’s perception about the lead arranger’s incentives to 
monitor.  
Although there is relatively rich literature on the importance of lender-borrower distance 
with respect to small business lending, the role of distance in syndicated lending is has not 
been studied to detail. According to my knowledge, there are no studies that investigate the 
importance of informational asymmetries caused by lender-borrower distance with respect 
to shocks to reputation.  
2.5. Defaults on syndicated loans 
According to Emery and Cantor (2005) loan default can occur as a result of three types of 
events: 
(a) A missed or delayed payment of interest and/or principal, including agreements to defer 
principal or interest payments; 
(b) A bankruptcy ﬁling or legal receivership; or 
(c) A distressed exchange or distressed restructuring where (i) the issuer covers loan holders 
a new security or package of securities that amount to a diminished ﬁnancial obligation 
(such as preferred or common stock, or debt with a lower coupon or par amount), or (ii) the 
exchange/restructuring had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid default 
These default events should be distinguished from technical defaults, such as covenant 
violations. Loan agreements usually included covenant which state the minimum levels for 
financial ratios. These are usually measured on a rolling, backward looking basis. Covenant 
violation represents a breach in loan contract. Depending on the loan contract, lender 
reaction may vary from simple waiver to renegotiation of the loan agreement or demanding 
immediate repayment of the loan. (Demiroglu and James, 2010) 
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In the event of default, syndicate members must reach collective decision on how to solve 
the issue. According to Sang and Mullineaux (2004) this typically involves majority 
decision with respect the technical defaults, covenant alterations or waiver requests. 
However, unanimous decision is usually required with respect to changes in loan maturities, 
amortization schedules or collaterals. 
There are, however, several reasons why default events on syndicated loans might not cause 
significant impact on banks. Firstly, prudent banking regulation ensures that the losses from 
a single borrower are unlikely to be too costly for a bank. Also, bank loans are typically 
secured and senior compared to other liabilities the borrower might have. (Dahiya, Saunders 
and Srinivasan, 2003)     
Although there are several reasons why distressed borrowers might not be problematic to 
banks, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2003) found that distress announcements of 
borrowers cause negative share price reaction for the lead arrangers. According to their 
study, distressed borrowers signal poor management and initiation skills and expose the 
leading bank to increased regulatory oversight, causing burden.  
Based on the study by Davydenko and Franks (2008), there are notable differences in credit 
protection across European countries. In their study of three countries, they find that banks 
significantly alter their lending practises to match the country’s bankruptcy regime. They 
find that although recovery rates in bankruptcies vary, the recovery rates in workouts are 
fairly similar across countries.  
2.6. Hypotheses 
This chapter outlines the key hypotheses used in the thesis and links them to the previously 
discussed theory.  
The delegation of responsibility creates potential agency problems in the syndicated loan 
market as the lead arranger responsible for the monitoring retains only a small share of the 
loan, while usually conducting a large share of the monitoring prior to the syndication.  
Reputation is likely to play an important role in the role syndication market as the 
participants engage in frequent and repeated transactions with one another. The participant 
members in these transactions are subject to counterparty risk. If one party in the market 
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loses its reputation as being good monitor and screener, it is likely to face difficulties in its 
future syndications.  
There are several different ways on how the loss of reputation can affect future syndication 
activity of an intermediary. The hypotheses below summarise these: 
Reputational hypotheses 
H1: If the reputation of the lead arranger suffers from defaults or distressed 
restructurings, the lead arranger will retain a larger portion of the loans after 
default events by lead arranger’s borrowers. 
According to the hypothesis H1, the default by borrowers can damage the reputation of the 
lead arranger and cause reputation related consequences. Since the monitoring actions of the 
lead arranger are unobservable, the market participants are only able to assess the lead 
arranger’s ability ex post.  Default events are therefore likely to damage the lead arranger’s 
reputation as a diligent monitor. 
In order to compensate this potential loss in reputation, the lead arranger has a greater 
incentive to retain a larger fraction of the loan it arranges (Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli 
2011). By taking on more credit risk in its balance sheet, the lead arranger will signal a 
stronger borrower quality. Further, it will compensate the decline in reputation-based 
incentives. 
H2: If the reputation of the lead arranger suffers from defaults or distressed 
restructurings, the lead arranger will have fewer participants in its future 
syndicates and its ability to attract participants to its syndicates is worsened. 
The possible loss in reputation can also damage the lead arranger’s ability to attract 
participants to the syndicate (Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli, 2011). If the lead arranger’s 
reputation as a monitor is damaged, the market participant’s may be unwilling to participate 
in syndicates as they perceive them as risky. This hypothesis is related to the previous one, 
as smaller number of participants can also lead to higher allocation to the syndicate 
members4. 
                                                   
4
 The allocation between the syndicate members can vary.  
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H3: If the reputation of the lead arranger suffers from defaults or distressed 
restructurings, the lead arranger will try to mitigate the loss of reputation by having 
additional lead arrangers in its subsequent syndicates. 
In their study, François and Missonier-Piera (2007) found that co-leads act as additional 
monitors when information asymmetries are severe. Their role can involve mitigating 
potential agency conflicts between informed lenders and participant members.  
Through H3, I aim to investigate if lead arrangers invite additional lead arrangers or co-
agents to syndicate after experiencing shock to reputation. According to my knowledge, 
there are no empirical studies that have investigated this.  
H4: Lead arrangers’ propensity to signal better monitoring quality after shock to its 
reputation is related to the amount of foreign participants in the syndicate. 
According to Lin et al. (2012) lead arrangers with lower reputation have less foreign 
participants in their syndicates. Furthemore, the study by Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) 
illustrates how the participants’ perception of lead arranger’s incentive to monitor worsens 
with cultural distance.  
With H4, I research if the signalling effect is after experiencing shock to reputation is 
dependent on the share of foreign participants. As the share of foreign participants increase, 
the incentive of the lead arranger to mitigate the reputational consequences by signalling 
increases.  
H5: Increase in the lender-borrower distance reinforces the reputational 
consequences of default events. 
Differences in cultural, geographical and legal differences between financial intermediaries 
have been identified as a cause for informational asymmetries. Several studies have used 
different distance metrics to proxy these informational asymmetries.  
In my study I utilise geographical distance between lender and borrower and domicile 
country proximity as proxies for informational asymmetries. I study how the interaction 
between lender-borrower distance and shocks to reputation affect the lead arrangers’ 
subsequent syndicates. 
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Alternative hypothesis 
H6: If default events erode the lead arranger’s capital base or damage the internal 
reputation, it will retain a lower share of future syndications following default 
event.  
If the default event leads to erosion in the lead arranger’s capital base, it could affect the 
subsequent syndication activity negatively. Besides losing valuable capital, the default 
event could also cause the lead arranger to lose existing lending relationship with the 
borrower. This in turn could cause the lead arranger to lose capital base, thus contracting 
future syndication activity. (Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli, 2011)     
According to Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011), default events can also lead to 
reassessment of the ability of the intermediary’s lending department to monitor borrowers. 
Lower internal performance of the lending department can cause the intermediary to 
reassess whether it is profitable or safe to engage in future syndications, thus contracting 
future syndication activity.  
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3. Data and methodology  
3.1. Data sources 
I obtain data on individual loan contracts from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database. 
Among others, SDC provides information on European syndicated loans including 
borrowers, lead arrangers, maturities and allocations.  
The titles given to syndicate members are numerous since many of the contract features are 
not standardised. Ivashina (2005) finds over 50 role titles given for the syndicate members 
in the U.S. loan market alone and none of them are mutually exclusive. According to her 
study, the leading bank can have many different titles, such as: book runner, lead arranger, 
lead bank, lead manager, agent and arranger. The Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database 
recognises lead arranger for each loan transaction. For the purposes of my study, I consider 
them as the mandated lead arrangers in each loan transaction. 
Default data on syndicated loans comes from the Leveraged Commentary & Data portal 
operated by Standard & Poor’s. From the database I am able to acquire a total of 202 cases 
of loan default or restructurings from 2000 to 2011. Information on default events is derived 
from public news sources and filings, and it is unlikely to be completely exhaustive. 
Distressed borrowers have undergone either a default event, including missed payment, D 
rating by a credit rating agency or bankruptcy, or have undertaken the beginning of a formal 
restructuring (retained advisors, agreement with lenders etc).   
I do not have information on what initially triggered the default event or how much the 
lenders were able to recover. According to Moody’s (2008) the issuer weighted recovery 
rate for European senior secured loans from 1985 to 2007 was 61%. With unsecured and 
junior loans, the recovery rates decline further. Similar finding with respect to the U.S. 
syndicated loan market is found by Altman and Suggitt (2000). These findings support my 
empirical proposition that default events by borrowers are costly for the lender also 
financially. Although it is not a prerequisite for the reputational hypotheses to hold, the 
financial consequences of defaults are likely to support them.  
Previous research conducted by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011) with the US data 
uses bankruptcy filing to proxy for an event that might potentially damage the 
intermediary’s reputation. My rich data set on borrower defaults allows me to compare if 
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defaults, such as missed payments, have different reputational outcomes than official 
restructurings. This is interesting as the severity of the default event is different in both 
cases: restructurings are concrete actions to help distressed companies usually involving 
conversion or write-down of debt, whereas missed payments are not as severe for the 
lender. 
Financial information on borrowers in my sample is also obtained from Bloomberg based 
on the SEDOL code provided by the SDC Platinum database. As SDC Platinum does not 
provide tickers for lead arrangers or participants, I manually match the names with 
Bloomberg tickers. The financial information for borrowers and lenders refers to the 
beginning of the financial year that the loan was originated. 
Data on geographical distances is acquired from GeoDist database developed by Mayer and 
Zignago (2011). The database provides several different distance measures for 225 different 
countries. For the purposes of this study, I utilise the geographical distance between two 
nations’ capitals. I also construct an alternative distance variable which examines the 
closeness of two countries in terms of shared border.    
3.2. Key Independent Variable 
The independent variable I utilise in the study is Default event, a dummy variable that 
identifies lead arrangers that have loans outstanding to borrower that have undergone a 
default or distressed restructuring. The variable is constructed as follows: for each firm that 
undergone a default or restructuring during the study period, I identify the loans outstanding 
for the borrower based on the maturities in the Thomson SDC Platinum database. This 
allows me to identify lenders that had loans outstanding to borrowers’ when they 
experienced default or restructuring. I am able to identify 202 default events that consist of 
643 separate loans. Each loan can have several lead arrangers, multiplying to amount of 
observations.    
In the regression, the lagged value of Default event is used as the main independent 
variable.  This variable encompasses both default and distressed restructurings. I further 
generate two additional variables, Restructuring and Default, which identify those lead 
arrangers that experienced either distressed restructuring or default, respectively.   
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3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides summary of the loan and default data from 1999 to 2010. I have data on 
over 11 000 individual loan transactions. A single loan transaction can include several 
different tranches and a single borrower might have engaged in several loan transactions 
during the study period.  
Table 1 – Summary statistics on loans and default events by year 
This table provides annual summary of the loan and default event data over the period from 1999 to 2011 
in my sample. Loan data is gathered from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. Default event data is obtained 
from Leveraged Commentary & Data portal by Standard & Poor’s. Default rate represents the total 
number of loan defaults in a year per the number of syndicated loans originated.  
Year 
Syndicated loans 
originated Defaults Restructurings Default events total Default rate 
1999 653 0 0 0 0 % 
2000 870 2 0 2 0 % 
2001 755 6 0 6 1 % 
2002 842 9 6 15 2 % 
2003 767 7 2 9 1 % 
2004 826 4 5 9 1 % 
2005 962 4 3 7 1 % 
2006 1170 10 3 13 1 % 
2007 1151 8 2 10 1 % 
2008 781 14 7 21 3 % 
2009 650 25 55 80 12 % 
2010 758 2 14 16 2 % 
2011 894 1 15 16 2 % 
Total 11079 90 112 202   
  
All of the loans described in the table are financed by a syndicate. However, some of the 
deals were fully underwritten by the lead arranger before closing of the deal. This 
effectively means that the lead arranger is underwriting the whole loan amount, with the 
intention to syndicate it to participants after closing.  
The data on Table I clearly shows that although the amount of syndicated originated each 
year has remained relatively stable, the number of default events varies from year to year. 
The largest number of default events occurred in 2009, during the aftermath of the financial 
crisis. The default rate is very low in every year expect 2009, which also saw the least 
amount of deals originated. Since the recession year can have unwanted effects on the 
results, I include robustness to control for these possibilities in chapter 4.4.     
21 
 
Figure II illustrates the development of the syndicated loan volume in my sample during the 
study period. 
Figure II – Total syndicated loan issuance by country 
The figure describes the total syndicated loan issuance by borrower’s domicile in my sample. The final 
sample from 1999 to 2011 consists of 11,079 deals. In total, the borrowers represent 38 different 
nationalities.   
 
Based on Figure II, the majority of the borrowers are domiciled in the UK, France or 
Germany and those countries represent the majority of the issuance volume. These findings 
are similar to those of Cabral, Dierick and Vesala (2002). Based on the figure, the 
syndicated loan volume contracted during the recession years 2002 and 2009.  
Table 2 presents the key summary statistics on the loan variables in the sample. 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics of the regression variable 
This table reports summary statistics for the key loan variables in my sample for loans originated in 1999 
to 2010. Each observation represents a loan. All variables are defined in the Appendix 
      Percentile distribution   
  Mean Std. Dev. 25
th Median 75th N 
Loan characteristics: 
      
Lead allocation (%) 16.6 16.3 6.7 11.3 20.0 3385 
Loan amount (in $ million) 554.1 1302.6 63.7 177.3 500.0 15417 
Defaulted loan amount (in $ million) 274.1 656.5 60.6 115.5 225.8 643 
Years to maturity 5.2 3.5 3.0 5.0 7.0 14354 
Number of participants 5.7 8.2 0.0 2.0 8.0 15417 
Share of foreign participants 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.9 3385 
Number of MLAs 5.0 3.6 3.0 5.0 7.0 14490 
Acquisition financing -dummy 1.4 3.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 30718 
Refinancing -dummy 1.3 3.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 30718 
Working capital -dummy 1.4 3.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 30718 
       
Borrower characteristics: 
      
Total assets (in $ billion) t-1 36.6 95.7 2.3 9.6 33.5 30718 
Market to book value t-1 4.6 14.0 2.0 2.9 4.4 30718 
Debt to assets t-1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 30718 
ROA (%) t-1  4.6 7.2 1.8 4.1 7.4 30718 
       
Lead arranger characteristics 
      
Default event -dummy  t-1 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 30718 
Restructuring -dummy t-1 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 30718 
Default -dummy t-1 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 30718 
Country default -dummy t-1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 30718 
Non-dominant lead 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 30718 
Dominant lead  0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 30718 
Total assets (in $ billion) t-1 1203.7 809.5 569.3 1009.7 1687.4 30718 
Tier 1 capital ratio (%) t-1 9.1 2.3 7.5 8.4 10.2 30718 
Capital adequacy ratio (%) t-1 12.4 2.3 11.0 11.9 13.5 30718 
ROA (%) t-1   0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.8 30718 
       
Lender-Borrower distance 
      
Lender-Borrower distance (in 1000 km) 1.7 2.6 0.3 0.4 1.4 30718 
Market distance 2.2 1.2 1.0 2.0 3.0 30718 
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4. Empirical results  
In this chapter I present my empirical results. First, in chapter 4.1 I investigate how the lead 
allocation is affected if lead arranger experiences shocks to its reputation. In chapters 4.1.1 
and 4.1.2, I study the impact of lead arranger’s domicile and the share of foreign participant 
on the lead allocation. 
Secondly, in chapter 4.2 I study how the composition of a syndicate changes after lead 
arranger’s borrower defaults. I also study how the lead arranger’s market power affects 
these effects. Chapter 4.3 provides examines the role of lender-borrower distance and its 
interaction with reputational consequences. Chapter 4.4 concludes the empirical section 
with robustness tests.  
4.1. Lead arranger allocation 
Firstly, I will examine how default events affect the Lead allocation for loans originated by 
the lead arranger in the year following the default event. The reputation hypothesis states 
that Lead allocation should increase following Default event as banks signal better 
monitoring quality. To test this prediction, I estimate panel regressions according to the 
following form: 
 
                                            
                       
(1)  
 
Where subscript l denotes the loan, i denotes the borrower, j denotes the lead arranger and t 
refers to the year in which the loan was originated. 
Since lead allocation can depend on unobservable borrower characteristics, I include both 
borrower fixed effects (µt) and time fixed (µt) effects in the regression. This regression 
setup is similar to the one used by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011), making my 
results comparable with the earlier findings. 
The fixed effects regression controls all time-invariant coefficients of borrowers, so the 
coefficients will not be biased due to omitted variables such as relationship or preferences 
(Baltagi, 2005). The model ensures that the effects I discover are within-borrower changes 
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in lead allocation if a lead arranger experienced Default event compared to the lead arranger 
that did not. In all regressions the standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual 
borrower level. (Baltagi, 2005) 
It can be argued that the lead allocation can also depend on unobservable lender 
characteristics. To control for this, I run the specification also with lender and year fixed 
effects. For robustness check, I use both borrower and lender fixed effects in addition to 
year fixed effects. The result for this is included in appendices.   
Control variables for borrower includes Log(Total assets) for size, EV to book value for 
growth opportunities and Debt to Assets for risk. Bank specific control variables include 
Tier 1 capital ratio and Capital adequacy ratio for financial health, Log(Total assets) for 
size and ROA for profitability. To control for syndication activity, I include variable 
Log(Lead size) which is the logarithm of average annual amount syndicated by the lead 
arranger over the past 2 years. 
Loan specific controls include Log(Loan size) for loan amount and dummy variables for 
acquisition financing, refinancing and working capital financing. I also include dummy 
variable Syndicate to control for those loans that were syndicated before the signing. This 
variable has a large effect on the regression, as lead allocation is measured at closing. 
Detailed description of the variables can be found from appendix. 
Table 3 presents the regression results.  
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Table 3 – Percentage of loan retained by the lead arranger 
This table reports the results of the regression investigating whether borrower defaults or restructurings 
have impact on the percentage of loan retained by the lead arranger. In all columns, I estimate the 
regression of the form: 
                                                                 
The dependent variable in column (1) is Default event, Restructuring in column (2) and Default in column 
(3). The regressions in columns (1) – (3) are controlled for borrower fixed effects and the regressions in 
column (4) – (6) for lender fixed effects. I control for year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard 
errors are robust in all specifications and clustered at the borrower or lead arranger level. 
  Expected Lead allocation (%) 
  effect (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Default event t-1 + 
-0.91 *** 
(-3.00) 
    
-2.20 ** 
(-2.20)     
Restructuring t-1 +   
-0.79 *** 
(-2.70) 
    
-3.95 *** 
(-4.29)   
Default  t-1 +     
-0.73 ** 
(-2.17) 
  
  
-1.76  
(-1.16) 
  
            
Log(Loan amount) 
 
-0.01  
(-0.03) 
-0.02  
(-0.03) 
-0.02  
(-0.03) 
-2.59 ***  
(-2.90) 
-2.61 ***  
(-2.93) 
-2.59 ***  
(-2.91) 
Years to maturity 
 
1.25 *** 
(3.61) 
1.25 *** 
(3.56) 
1.25 *** 
(3.59) 
0.23  
(1.33) 
0.22  
(1.26) 
0.24  
(1.34) 
Number of MLAs 
 
-0.32 ** 
(-2.17) 
-0.31 ** 
(-2.17) 
-0.32 ** 
(-2.21) 
-0.43 *** 
(-9.45) 
-0.43 *** 
(-9.19) 
-0.44 *** 
(-9.32) 
Number of participants 
 
-0.35 *** 
(-3.25) 
-0.35 *** 
(-3.24) 
-0.35 *** 
(-3.25) 
-0.31 *** 
(-8.11) 
-0.31 *** 
(-8.17) 
-0.31 *** 
(-8.02) 
Acquisition Financing -dummy 
 
4.28 
(1.46) 
4.26  
(1.46) 
4.26  
(1.46) 
0.77 
(0.69) 
0.70 
(0.63) 
0.79 
(0.70) 
Refinancing -dummy 
 
-3.99 *** 
(-2.74) 
-3.99 *** 
(-2.74) 
-4.02 *** 
(-2.74) 
-1.32 *** 
(-2.62) 
-1.30 *** 
(-2.62) 
-1.33 *** 
(-2.65) 
Working Capital -dummy 
 
-5.59 *** 
(-2.83) 
-5.55 *** 
(-2.82) 
-5.59 *** 
(-2.82) 
-1.15  
(-1.39) 
-1.15  
(-1.40) 
-1.15  
(-1.39) 
Syndicate - 
-72.13 *** 
(-12.09) 
-72.33 *** 
(-12.11) 
-72.10 *** 
(-12.01) 
-68.73 *** 
(-14.45) 
-68.69 *** 
(-14.31) 
-68.54 *** 
(-14.31) 
  
            
Log(Total assets, borrower) t-1  
 
-0.99  
(-0.54) 
-1.02  
(-0.55) 
-0.94  
(-0.52) 
0.41  
(0.89) 
0.41  
(0.89) 
0.41  
(0.88) 
EV to Book Value, borrower t-1 
 
0.29  
(1.45) 
0.29  
(1.43) 
0.29  
(1.46) 
0.14 **  
(3.32) 
0.14 **  
(2.26) 
0.14 **  
(2.31) 
Debt to Assets, borrower t-1 
 
-20.45 ** 
(-1.95) 
-20.54 ** 
(-1.95) 
-20.34 ** 
(-1.94) 
-2.35  
(1.17) 
-2.15  
(1.05) 
-2.42  
(1.19) 
Log(Lead size) t-1 
 
0.47 ***  
(3.38) 
0.45 ***  
(3.34) 
0.45 ***  
(3.33) 
2.32 ***  
(3.84) 
2.32 ***  
(3.84) 
2.34 ***  
(3.80) 
  
            
Tier 1 Capital Ratio, lead t-1  
-0.23  
(-1.40) 
-0.23  
(-1.36) 
-0.23  
(-1.35) 
1.65 *** 
(2.97) 
1.53 *** 
(2.79) 
1.60 ***  
(2.79) 
Capital adequacy ratio, lead t-1  
0.29 ***  
(3.38) 
0.27 ***  
(2.91) 
0.25 ***  
(2.78) 
-0.69  
(-1.44) 
-0.63  
(-1.25) 
-0.71  
(-1.51) 
ROA, lead t-1   
0.10   
(0.35) 
0.14   
(0.49) 
0.13   
(0.47) 
-2.21   
(-1.56) 
-2.15   
(-1.51) 
-2.17   
(-1.50) 
Log(Total assets, lead) t-1  
-0.27  
(-1.59) 
-0.26  
(-1.56) 
-0.31 *  
(-1.75) 
-4.61 ***  
(-3.18) 
-4.87 ***  
(-3.72) 
-4.56 ***  
(-2.85) 
  
            
Obs.  
2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 2480 
R2  
0.57 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.53 
Specification  
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Borrower and Year Fixed Effects  
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Lender and Year Fixed Effects   No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Based on the results from column (1), lead arrangers retain 0.91 percentage points less of 
the loans they arrange after their borrower has experienced a default event the previous 
year. The result is economically significant, as it represents approximately 8% drop in the 
lead allocation compared to the median allocation of 11.29%. The coefficient for Default 
event in column (1) is statistically significant at 1% level. 
The result contradicts the findings by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011), who found 
that large bankruptcies by borrowers cause lead arranger to increase lead allocation by 4.95 
in the loans they arrange the subsequent year. My result does not find support for the 
hypothesis H1, which states that lead arrangers should retain a larger share of the loans they 
syndicate after a default event. Instead, the result supports the hypothesis H6. According to 
the alternative hypothesis the lead arranger retain a lower share of the loans they syndicate 
due to loss in capital base or due to internal reassessment of the ability of lending function 
to conduct monitoring.  
My findings are similar even after dividing the variable Default event into restructurings 
and defaults in columns (2) and (3). According to result from column (2), restructurings 
also cause lead arrangers to retain a statistically significantly lower amount in future 
syndications. With coefficient value of -0.79, the effect of Restructuring on the lead 
allocation is slightly lower than with all default events combined. Based on the findings in 
column (3), defaults cause lead arrangers to retain 0.73 percentage points less in future 
syndication. The effects of Restructuring are significant at 1% level, while the effect of 
Default is significant at 5% level. The different significance level supports the idea that 
restructurings cause more severe financial consequences for the lender.  
The fact that the coefficient for Restructuring is both economically and statistically 
significant provides additional support for the alternative hypothesis H6. The characteristic 
feature of restructurings is that the lenders agree to write-off some of their debt or to 
convert it to equity. This means that following a restructuring, the capital base of an 
intermediary is likely to decrease. The results in column (2) imply that this lower capital 
base in fact causes intermediaries to take lower stakes in future syndications.    
As a robustness test, I run the same regressions using lender fixed effects in columns (4), 
(5) and (6). This allows controlling for unobservable lender characteristics. The results 
support earlier findings and imply that arrangers retain less of the loans they syndicate after 
experiencing Default event or Restructuring. The coefficient value of -3.95 for 
restructurings translates to approximately 35% in lead allocation compared to the median 
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value. The effect is largest and it is also significant at 1% level. As the nature of debt 
restructuring is more severe than just ordinary default, this finding is also intuitive. 
4.1.1. Effect of lead arranger’s domicile 
My findings suggest that in European loan markets lack the signalling effect that Gopalan, 
Nanda and Yerramilli (2011) found to exist in in the United States. In order to gain a better 
understanding on the differences between the two markets, I investigate if the effect I 
discovered is dependent on the domicile of the lead arranger. It might be that the differences 
in market environment between European countries affect the signalling propensity of the 
financial intermediaries.  
Table 4 – Effect of lead arranger’s domicile 
Table 4 presents the results from regressions where I study the interaction between the lead arranger’s 
domicile and Default event. The dummy variable Nordic bank includes banks domiciled either in 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland or Norway. As an additional control variable I include the lead arranger’s 
domicile (X (β3)) to avoid biased results. All other control variables are same as in the Table 3, but they are 
suppressed for brevity. I control borrower fixed effects and year fixed effects in all regressions. Standard 
errors are robust in all specifications and clustered at the borrower level. 
  Lead allocation (%)   Lead allocation (%)   Lead allocation (%) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
  X = American bank  
X = Nordic bank 
 
X = British Bank 
Default event t-1 (β1) 
-0.90 *** 
(-2.97)  
-0.91 *** 
(-3.02)  
-0.90 *** 
(-2.97) 
Default event t-1 x X (β2) 
0.43  
(0.61) 
 
1.65 ***  
(4.29) 
 
-0.04  
(-0.11) 
X (β3) 
0.12  
(0.29) 
 
0.22  
(0.79) 
 
-0.12  
(-0.53) 
      
Obs. 2480 
 
2480 
 
2480 
R2 0.57 
 
0.57 
 
0.57 
Specification OLS 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes   Yes   Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
The key finding from Table 4 is the positive and statistically significant interaction 
coefficient for Nordic banks in column (2). This suggests that default events cause the lead 
allocation Nordic banks to increase by 0.74 percentage following default events. This 
finding supports the reputation hypothesis H1, 7and suggests that banks operating in the 
Nordic region signal better monitoring quality by retaining larger share of the loans they 
syndicate. 
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Based on the findings from column (1), the interaction term between American banks and 
default events is statistically insignificant. The same conclusion applies for British banks in 
column (3). The finding suggests that country of domicile has some effect on the behaviour 
of lead arrangers after their borrowers have experienced defaults. Effectively, it seems that 
Nordic banks are more concerned about their reputation as diligent monitors, causing them 
to signal better quality. The differences might be caused by different operating 
environments.   
In the next section, I study how the dependence on foreign participants affects the 
propensity to signal better monitoring quality. In their study, (Lin et al. 2012) found that 
lead arrangers that have low reputation have less foreign participants in their syndicates. It 
might be that lead arrangers operating in a small marketplace are dependent on foreign 
participants, and therefore are more concerned about their reputation.  
4.1.2. Role of foreign participants 
Previous studies have found the reputation of a lead arranger to have significant impact on 
the syndicate structure. According to Lin et al. (2012) lead arrangers with high reputation 
have lower syndicate concentration and a higher number of foreign participants in the 
syndicate they arrange. Furthermore, Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) find that an increase in 
cultural distance between participant and lead arranger damage the participant’s expectation 
on the lead arranger’s willingness and incentive to conduct monitoring. These findings 
suggest that shocks to lead arranger’s reputation might have stronger consequences for 
foreign participants.   
In this section I study if the lead arrangers are more likely to signal better monitoring 
quality after default event if they have higher share of foreign participants in their current 
syndicate. If a loss of reputation discourages foreign participants to join the subsequent 
syndicates, the lead arranger has a larger incentive to signal better monitoring by retaining 
larger share of the loan.  
To study this proposition, I calculate the share of foreign participants in each deal separately 
for each lead arranger. I consider the participant to be foreign if it has different country of 
domicile from the lead arranger. In order to study the interaction of default events and the 
share of foreign participants, I construct an interaction variable Share of foreign 
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participants x Default event t-1. I include the Share of foreign participants as an additional 
control variable to avoid biased results.  
For robustness, I run the regression controlling both lender and borrower fixed effects 
separately. I also include year fixed effects in all regressions.  
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Table 5 – Role of foreign participants 
Table 5 reports the results from the interaction between default events and the share of foreign 
participants. The dependent variable in both columns is Lead allocation. As independent variables I use 
Default event, Share of foreign participants and their interaction variable. I control for year fixed effects 
in all regressions. Additionally, I control borrower fixed effects in column (1) and lender fixed effects in 
column (2). Standard errors are robust in all specifications and clustered at the lead or borrower level. 
        
 
Lead allocation (%) 
 
Lead allocation (%) 
  (1)   (2) 
Default event t-1 
-3.48 ***   
(-2.71) 
 
-9.24 ***   
(-3.96) 
Share of foreign participants 
-2.87 ***   
(-3.02) 
 
-9.65 ***   
(-7.03) 
Share of foreign participants x Default event t-1 
3.17 **   
(2.25) 
 
9.38 ***   
(4.01) 
    
Log(Loan amount) 
0.01   
(0.01)  
-2.37 ***   
(-2.94) 
Years to maturity 
1.23 ***  
(3.56)  
0.23   
(1.34) 
Number of MLAs 
-0.30 **  
(2.12)  
-0.41 ***  
(-9.63) 
Number of participants 
-0.33 ***  
(-3.20)  
-0.27 ***  
(-8.06) 
Acquisition Financing -dummy 
3.98   
(1.51)  
0.82   
(0.74) 
Refinancing -dummy 
-3.63 ***   
(-2.54)  
-1.09 **   
(-2.33) 
Working Capital -dummy 
-5.58 ***   
(-2.70)  
-0.74    
(-0.99) 
Syndicate 
-71.64 ***   
(-11.58) 
 
-62.81 ***   
(-11.02) 
    
Log(Total assets, borrower) t-1  
-1.11   
(-0.61)  
0.51   
(1.10) 
EV to Book Value, borrower t-1 
0.30 *  
(1.69)  
0.12 **  
(2.23) 
Debt to Assets, borrower t-1 
-22.07 ***  
(-2.57)  
1.99   
(0.97) 
Log(Lead size) t-1 
0.44 ***    
(3.10)  
2.06 ***    
(3.41) 
  
   
Tier 1 Capital Ratio, lead t-1 
-0.23    
(-1.42)  
1.34 ***    
(2.75) 
Capital adequacy ratio, lead t-1 
-0.26 ***     
(2.81)  
-0.56      
(-1.28) 
ROA, lead t-1  
0.11      
(0.42)  
-1.94      
(-1.39) 
Log(Total assets, lead) t-1 
-0.17      
(-1.06)  
-4.31 ***      
(--2.61) 
    
Obs. 2480  
2480 
R2 0.58  
0.56 
Specification OLS  
OLS 
Year Fixed effects Yes  
Yes 
Borrower / Lender Fixed Effects Borrower   Lender 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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The results from Table 5 imply that lead arrangers’ propensity to signal better monitoring 
quality after its borrower experiences a default is affected by the share of foreign 
participants in a syndicate. The coefficient for the interaction variable Share of foreign 
participants x Default event t-1 is positive and statistically significant in columns (1) and (2). 
In column (1) where I control for borrower fixed effects the effect is statistically significant 
at 5% level and in column (2) with lender fixed effects it is significant at 1% level. 
These finding provide support for hypothesis H5, which suggests that the share of foreign 
participants in a syndicate reinforces the reputational consequences. My findings also 
complement the study by Giannetti and Yafeh (2012), who suggest that foreign participants’ 
perception of the lead arrangers incentive to conduct monitoring is lower. The regression 
results suggest that lead arrangers are aware of this and are willing to signal better 
monitoring by retaining larger share of the loan.  
Furthermore, my results imply that lead arrangers are opportunistic and only use signalling 
when it is required to form a syndicate. The findings complement the work by Gopalan, 
Nanda and Yerramilli (2011) who found the signalling to take place automatically after a 
shock to reputation. According to my knowledge, there are no previous studies that have 
identified this effect.   
4.1.3. Persistence of the effects of default events 
So far I have studied how the syndication activity of a lead arranger changes the year 
following the default event. However, in order to gain a better understanding of the effects 
of default events, I study the persistence of the reputational effects.  
In this section I study examine how many years it takes for the effect of default events on 
lead allocation to wear off. In table 6 I examine the effects of default events on lead 
allocation after 1, 2 and 3 years after they occurred. Since lead arrangers can potentially 
experience default events every year, I include interaction terms involving multiple lags of 
Default events. The regression form is identical to formula (1), except that I include 
multiple lags of the dummy variable Default events.  
I also investigate if the default events have any effect on the syndication propensity. To do 
this, I utilise the variable Syndicate, which is a dummy variable identifying those deals 
which are syndicated prior to closing. Underwritten deals are potentially riskier for the lead 
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arranger as they have to reduce their share of the deal after signing. If unsuccessful, the lead 
arranger may retain a higher exposure of the loan.  
As my previous findings suggest that the lead arranger reduces its relative exposure after 
Default event, intuitively the lead arranger should do less underwriting, i.e. the effect to 
Syndicate should be positive. Table 6 reports the result from the regression with multiple 
lagged values of Default event. 
Table 6 – Persistence of effect of default events 
Table 6 reports the results from the persistence of the effects caused by default events. The dependent 
variable in column (1) is Lead allocation and Syndicate in column (2). As independent variable I use 
lagged values of Default event. The control variables are same as in the Table 3, but they are suppressed 
for brevity. I control borrower fixed effects in column (1) and lender fixed effects in (2). I also control for 
year fixed effects in all regressions. Standard errors are robust in all specifications and clustered at the 
lead or borrower level. 
        
 
Lead allocation (%) 
 
Syndicate 
  (1)   (2) 
Default event t-1 
-0.93 ***   
(-3.01) 
 
-0.01   
(-1.47) 
Default event t-2 
-0.23    
(-0.37) 
 
0.00   
(0.94) 
Default event t-3 
0.36    
(1.15) 
 
0.00   
(0.50) 
  
 
 
Obs. 2480  
2480 
R2 0.57  
0.08 
Specification OLS  
OLS 
Year Fixed effects Yes  
Yes 
Borrower / Lender Fixed Effects Borrower   Lender 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses   
 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
The findings from column (1) in Table 6 suggest that the decrease of Lead allocation after 
Default event is confined to only one year. The first lagged value of Default event is 
statistically significant, while the others are not. This suggests that the effects of 
reputational shocks are only confined to one year.  
Based on the findings in column (2) the shocks to lead arrangers’ reputation do not affect 
the underwriting propensity. All of the lagged variables are statistically insignificant in 
column (2), suggesting that reputational shocks do not play a role in determining the 
syndication strategy. 
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4.2. Syndicate composition 
In this chapter I investigate how the shocks to lead arranger reputation affect syndicate 
composition or the characteristics of borrowers. First, I study how the composite of the 
syndicate changes after lead arranger’s borrower experienced Default event. I also generate 
a new dummy variable, Country default, which takes into account how the domicile of the 
defaulted borrower affects the subsequent deals in the same country. The dummy variable 
Country default takes a value of one, if the domicile of the defaulted borrower has the same 
domicile as the borrower in the current deal.    
Secondly, I investigate how the lead arranger’s market power affects the reputational effects 
that borrower defaults cause for lead arrangers. Thirdly, I study how the lead arranger’s 
ability to attract participants is affected by the borrower defaults. Finally, I study how the 
borrower defaults affect subsequent borrower choice by lead arrangers and if they become 
more risk averse.   
4.2.1. Effects of default events on syndicate composition 
Syndication is effectively risk sharing. According to hypothesis H2, the lead arranger will 
have fewer non-arranging participants in a syndicate following a loss in reputation. If other 
financial intermediaries doubt the lead arranger’s ability to monitor the borrower and find it 
risky, they are unwilling to participate in the syndicate.  
Furthermore, after a loss in reputation the lead arranger has an incentive to signal more 
diligent monitoring in its subsequent syndications. It can achieve this by increasing the 
share it retains in its balance sheet, the lead allocation. Alternatively, the lead arranger 
signal better monitoring quality by syndicating the loan with co-lead arrangers. Previous 
studies suggest that arranging banks tend to have co-lead arrangers when arranging loans to 
opaque customers or industries. In this section, I aim to investigate if losses in reputation 
causes lead arrangers to signal better monitoring quality by including additional lead 
arrangers.   
Finally, study by Lin et al. (2012) suggests that lead arrangers with lower reputation have 
fewer foreign participants in their syndicates. In columns (4) and (5), I study if default 
events damage the perceived reputation of the lead arranger and cause them to lose foreign 
participants in their subsequent syndicates.  
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Table 7 – Composition of the syndicate after default event 
In Table 7 I study how the composition of a syndicate is affected if the lead arranger has experiences a 
default in t-1. The main independent variables are Default event and Country default. The dependent 
variable in columns (1) and (2) is Number of participants, in column (3) and (4) Number of MLAs and 
share of foreign participants in columns (5) and (6). All variables are defined in the appendix.  I control 
borrower fixed effects and year fixed effects in all regressions. Standard errors are robust in all 
specifications and clustered at the lead level.  
                  
 
# of participants in a syndicate 
 
# of MLAs in a syndicate 
 
Share of foreign participants (%) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Default event t-1 
0.03  
(0.15)   
-0.03   
(-0.17)   
-0.11 
(-0.14)  
Country default t-1 
 
-0.25  
(-0.86)   
-0.55 ***  
(-2.65)   
-1.24 
(-0.98) 
         
Log(Loan amount) 
1.20 ***  
(13.51) 
1.20 ***  
(13.52)  
1.63 ***  
(24.43) 
1.63 ***  
(24.80)  
0.88 **  
(2.38) 
0.89 **  
(2.38) 
Years to maturity 
-0.05 **  
(-2.36) 
-0.05 **  
(-2.39)  
-0.02   
(-1.47) 
-0.02   
(-1.62)  
0.43 **   
(3.43) 
0.42 ***   
(3.39) 
Number of MLAs 
-0.07 ***  
(-4.96) 
-0.07 ***  
(-5.01)     
0.00   
(0.05) 
0.00   
(0.02) 
Number of participants 
 
 
 
-0.03 ***  
(-5.43) 
-0.03 ***  
(-5.51)  
3.00 ***   
(20.39) 
3.00 ***   
(20.42) 
Acquisition Financing -
dummy 
0.54 **   
(2.14) 
0.53 **   
(2.13)  
0.21 *   
(1.76) 
0.20 *   
(1.68)  
-1.02    
(-1.19) 
-1.02    
(-1.19) 
Refinancing -dummy 
0.14    
(0.74) 
0.15    
(0.76)  
-0.11   
(-1.18) 
-0.10   
(-1.07)  
-2.32 ***   
(-3.07) 
-2.30 ***   
(-3.03) 
Working Capital -dummy 
-0.71 ***  
(-4.84) 
-0.70 ***  
(-4.84)  
-1.09 ***  
(-11.15) 
-1.09 ***  
(-11.06)  
-1.85 **  
(-2.39) 
-1.84 **  
(-2.37) 
         
Log(Total assets, borrower) t-1  
0.25 ***  
(5.23) 
0.25 ***  
(5.26)  
0.75 ***  
(20.59) 
0.75 ***  
(20.23)  
0.31   
(1.09) 
0.29   
(1.05) 
EV to Book Value, borrower t-1 
0.00   
(0.15) 
0.00   
(0.15)  
0.00 ***   
(-3.06) 
0.00 ***   
(-3.06)  
-0.04    
(-1.39) 
-0.04    
(-1.39) 
Debt to Assets, borrower t-1 
2.36 ***   
(5.03) 
2.36 ***   
(5.03)  
0.00    
(-0.01) 
0.00    
(-0.03)  
11.11 ***    
(6.54) 
11.09 ***    
(6.51) 
Log(Loans by lead t-1) 
-0.02    
(-0.27) 
-0.02    
(-0.26)  
-0.13 ***    
(-2.68) 
-0.13 ***    
(-2.73)  
0.26     
(0.64) 
0.25     
(0.61) 
  
        
Tier 1 Capital Ratio, lead t-1 
0.15    
(1.57) 
0.15    
(1.59)  
-0.05    
(-0.72) 
-0.04    
(-0.61)  
0.39    
(0.68) 
0.41    
(0.70) 
Capital adequacy ratio, lead t-1 
-0.06    
(-0.72) 
-0.06    
(-0.70)  
-0.02    
(-0.33) 
-0.02    
(-0.36)  
-0.20    
(-0.53) 
-0.21    
(-0.54) 
ROA, lead t-1  
-0.52 *    
(-1.78) 
-0.55 *    
(-1.79)  
0.34 **    
(2.35) 
0.33 **    
(2.25)  
-0.23    
(-0.16) 
-0.26    
(-0.18) 
Log(Total assets, lead) t-1 
0.05)    
(0.08) 
0.19)    
(0.14)  
-0.30     
(-1.16) 
-0.22     
(-0.90)  
-0.68     
(-0.38) 
-0.52     
(-0.29) 
         
Obs. 30719 30719   30719 30719   30719 30719 
R2 0.15 0.15   0.37 0.37   0.31 0.31 
Specification OLS OLS   OLS OLS   OLS OLS 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Lender Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
 
First, in column (1) I study how default events in the previous year affect the number of 
participants in the syndicate. Based on the results, the variable Default event has no effect 
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on the number of participants as the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Further, the 
coefficient for Country dummy in column (2) is also statistically insignificant. These results 
do not provide support for the hypothesis H2, according to which default events should 
cause lead arranger’s to have fewer participant members in their syndicates. In section 
4.2.3, I will further investigate how the lead arranger’s ability to attract a specific participant 
is affected by default events.   
In columns (3) and (4) I investigate if lead arranger signal better monitoring quality after 
default events by acquiring additional lead arrangers in their syndicates. Based on the 
results from column (3), the variable Default event has no statistically significant effect on 
the number of mandated lead arrangers in a syndicate.  
However, the results from column (4) indicate that the variable Default event has 
statistically significant and negative effect on the number of mandated lead arrangers if the 
default has occurred in the same country. The coefficient for Country default is -0.55, which 
suggests that lead arrangers have fewer co-leads in their syndicate following defaults in the 
same country. The result represents an 11% decrease in the number of MLAs and the result 
is significant at 1% level. This result is contradictory to the hypothesis H3, which states that 
lead arrangers will signal better monitoring quality by increasing the amount of co-load 
arrangers.  
Instead, it seems that other market participants perceive the monitoring quality to have 
worsened and they are unwilling event to co-lead a syndicate. The finding provides 
evidence that other market participants consider defaults by borrowers more severe if they 
take place in the same country. The finding suggests that defaults by borrowers can have 
reputational consequences even if it does not result in signalling. 
Another explanation is that the default causes the lead arranger to lend to smaller borrowers, 
which do not require as intense monitoring by co-leads. I will study this proposition further 
in the chapter 4.2.4, where I investigate how the default events affect the borrower and loan 
characteristics.  
I investigate how the reputational shocks affect the share of foreign participant in a 
syndicate in columns (5) and (6). According to the results, variables Default event or 
Country default do not have statistically significant effect on the share of foreign 
participants in a deal. This finding complements the  work by Lin et al. (2012), who found 
that lead arrangers with lower reputation have fewer foreign participants in their syndicates. 
My findings suggest that foreign participants do not consider the default events to cause 
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severe effects on the lead arranger’s reputation. The finding is directly related to results in 
chapter 4.1.2, where I find that the signalling propensity is affected by the share of foreign 
participants. It seems that lead arrangers are able to mitigate the reputational concerns of 
foreign participants by retaining larger share of the loans with high foreign participation. As 
a consequence, the share of foreign participants is not affected by reputational shocks.  
4.2.2. Role of lead arranger’s market power 
In their study Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011) found that dominant lead arrangers did 
not retain a larger fraction of the lead allocation after experiencing bankruptcies. According 
to their study in the US market, the negative consequences of bankruptcies were only 
limited to lead arrangers who were not dominant in terms of syndication volume. They 
conclude that reputational disciplining methods are not effective for lead arrangers having 
dominant market position. 
In order to investigate whether their findings hold in the European loan syndication market, 
I construct a variable measuring the relative dominance of lead arranger in a specific 
country. I consider dominant lead arrangers those whose number of loan syndicated is 
above a country’s average in a specific year. Effectively, dominant lead arrangers have been 
the lead arranger more often than its competitors on average. Similarly, non-dominant lead 
arrangers are those whose participation rate is below the country’s average at time t. I 
construct two dummy variables to study the effects of market power, Dominant Lead and 
Non-dominant lead.   
In order to study if the consequences of default events vary based on lead arranger’s 
dominance, I multiply the dummy variables with the earlier dummy Default event. The new 
interaction variables show how the effects of Default event change according to the market 
power.  
In the regression analysis I use Number of MLAs and Share of foreign participants as 
dependent variables. To control for arranger, loan and borrower specific factors the same set 
of control variables is used than in previous regressions. 
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Table 8 – Effects of lead arranger’s market power on syndicate composition 
In table 8 I conduct subsample test to investigate if the effects of default vary according to the lead 
arranger’s dominance in a specific country. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is Number of 
MLAs and in column (3) and (4) the Share of foreign participants. As independent variables I use Default 
event, Dominant lead, Non-dominant lead and their interaction variables. I control for year and lender 
fixed effects in all regressions. Standard errors are robust in all specifications and clustered at the lead 
arranger level. 
            
 
# of MLAs in a syndicate 
 
Share of foreign participants (%) 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Default event t-1 
0.20   
(1.22) 
-0.26   
(-1.41) 
 
-0.79   
(-0.66) 
1.27   
(1.10) 
Dominant lead t-1 
-1.01 ***   
(8.87) 
  
-4.83 ***   
(-3.54)  
Dominant lead t-1 x Default event t-1 
-0.41 ***   
(2.73) 
  
1.71    
(0.96) 
 
Non-Dominant lead t-1 
 
0.93 ***  
(7.75) 
 
 
5.52 ***  
(4.32) 
Non-Dominant lead t-1 x Default event t-1 
 
0.52 ***  
(3.31)   
-2.45   
(-1.33) 
      
Log(Loan amount) 
1.57 ***  
(24.36) 
1.60 ***  
(24.65)  
4.08 ***  
(10.43) 
4.05 ***  
(10.37) 
Years to maturity 
-0.03 **  
(-2.03) 
-0.03 **  
(-1.96)  
0.25 ** 
(1.95) 
0.25 **  
(1.97) 
Number of MLAs 
   
0.00   
(-0.67) 
0.00   
(-0.63) 
Number of participants 
-0.03 ***  
(-5.53) 
-0.03 ***  
(-5.60)  
0.03 ***  
(20.66) 
0.03 ***  
(20.64) 
Acquisition Financing -dummy 
0.17   
(1.38) 
0.17   
(1.43)  
0.44   
(0.45) 
0.42   
(0.44) 
Refinancing -dummy 
-0.13   
(-1.27) 
-0.13   
(-1.29)  
-1.94 *   
(-1.91) 
-1.96 *   
(-1.92) 
Working Capital -dummy 
-1.07 ***  
(-10.81) 
-1.06 ***  
(-10.76)  
-3.76 ***  
(-4.13) 
-3.72 ***  
(-4.10) 
      
Log(Total assets, borrower) t-1  
0.72 ***  
(19.95) 
0.72 ***  
(20.01)  
0.83 ***  
(2.62) 
0.82 ***  
(2.62) 
EV to Book Value, borrower t-1 
0.00 ***  
(-3.30) 
0.00 ***  
(-3.31)  
-0.03   
(-1.52) 
-0.04   
(-1.51) 
Debt to Assets, borrower t-1 
-0.14  
(-0.36) 
-0.13  
(-0.34)  
18.01 ***  
(8.59) 
18.04 ***  
(8.61) 
Log(Loans by lead t-1) 
-0.01    
(-0.30) 
-0.02    
(-0.51)  
0.74    
(1.51) 
0.80    
(1.51) 
  
     
Tier 1 Capital Ratio, lead t-1 
-0.06    
(-0.82) 
-0.06    
(-0.84)  
0.85    
(1.47) 
0.84    
(1.45) 
Capital adequacy ratio, lead t-1 
-0.02     
(-0.31) 
-0.02     
(-0.30)  
-0.39     
(-0.98) 
-0.38     
(-0.97) 
ROA, lead t-1  
0.37 ***     
(2.67) 
0.39 ***     
(2.74)  
-1.89      
(-1.09) 
-1.85      
(-1.08) 
Log(Total assets, lead) t-1 
-0.32     
(-1.19) 
-0.29     
(-1.07)  
-1.00     
(-0.43) 
-1.03     
(-0.44) 
      
Obs. 30719 30719  
30719 30719 
R2 0.38 0.38  
0.07 0.07 
Specification OLS OLS  
OLS OLS 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes  
Yes Yes 
Lender Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The regression results from column (1) show that dominant lead arrangers have fewer co-
lead arrangers in their syndicates following borrower defaults. The interaction variable 
Dominant lead t-1 x Default event t-1 is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. The 
finding supports my earlier observations on syndicate composition in chapter 4.2.1, where I 
found that Country defaults cause lead arrangers to have fewer co-leads in the subsequent 
syndicates. The finding suggests that other financial intermediaries are unwilling to 
participate in a syndicate following a default event. This finding is contradictory to the 
earlier studies suggesting that reputational disciplining methods are not effective for 
dominant lead arrangers.  
According to hypothesis H3, lead arrangers will signal better monitoring quality by 
increasing the amount of co-lead arrangers in the syndicate. The results from column (2) 
provide partial support for the hypothesis. The interaction coefficient for non-dominant 
leads is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that non-dominant lead 
signal better monitoring quality after a loss in reputation. The effect is also economically 
significant, as the 0.93 increase in the number of lead arrangers represents approximately 
19% increase compared to the median amount of 5.  
The results from column (1) and (2) provide support for the reputational hypothesis H3 only 
partially. Based on the findings, only non-dominant lead arrangers invite additional co-leads 
to their syndicates following borrower defaults. On the other hand, dominant lead arrangers 
have fewer co-leads in their syndicates following default events. The finding supports the 
earlier findings by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011) who found dominant lead 
arrangers do not suffer from reputational consequences.  
However, the fact that dominant leads have lower amount of co-leads in subsequent 
syndicates is perplexing. It suggests that shocks to reputation are damaging, but dominant 
leads choose not to signal better monitoring. It could be that non-dominant leads could not 
participate in the syndicate markets without signalling.  On the other hand, dominant leads 
are able to attend the syndication market without signalling.  
Based on the findings from column (3) and (4), the lead arrangers’ dominance has no 
statistically significant effect on the share of foreign participants in a syndicate. Both of the 
interaction variables are statistically insignificant. The findings support my earlier findings 
from chapter 4.2.1 where I found that default events have no impact on the share of foreign 
participants.  
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4.2.3. Lead arranger’s ability to attract participants 
According to the reputation hypotheses the lead arranger’s ability to attract participants is 
damaged due to loss in reputation. Participant members rely on the lead arranger to monitor 
the borrower on their behalf. Bad performance in monitoring may cause participant lenders 
to avoid participating in syndicates arranged by the lead arranger, who suffered a loss to its 
reputation.  
However, the participant members depend on lead arrangers for access to loan syndicates. 
Therefore, avoiding certain lead arrangers might impose costs on the participants as they 
lose access to the possible revenues associated with it. In this section, I examine how the 
characteristics of participant lenders affect their willingness to participate syndicates of lead 
arrangers that have experienced reputational shocks.  
To do so, I construct a panel data with one observation for each lead arranger-participant-
year combination. The data includes all pairs of lead arrangers and participants who 
syndicated a loan together during 1999-2011. Following (Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli, 
2011) I estimate the following panel regression; 
 
                         
                                     
                                               
(2)  
  
where Loans togetherjkt is the number of loans syndicated together by lead arranger j with 
participant lender k during year t. Since the variable Loans together is highly skewed, I use 
the Log(1+Loans together)jkt. Also, since the value for Loans together can be zero, I add one 
to avoid missing values. In order to avoid multiple zero observations in the dependent 
variable, I include lead arrangers until one year after it syndicates its last loan. Also, I 
include each participant lender until one year after it participates its last loan. The same 
configuration was used by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011). 
Since the amount of syndication activity between any lead arranger-participant pair may be 
affected by unobserved variables, I include lead arranger-participant pair fixed effects (µjk).  
I additionally control for year fixed effects (µt).   
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Table 9 – Lead arranger’s ability to attract participants 
Table 9 reports the results of regressions designed to investigate how loss of reputation affects lead 
arrangers’ ability to attract participants to its syndicates. I estimate panel OLS regressions of the 
following form:  
                         
                                                                                      
where Loans togetherjkt is the number of loans syndicated together by lead arranger j with participant 
lender k during year t. In column (1), X equals one. In column (2), X is Large participant, which is a 
dummy variable identifying those participants who are in the top quartile in terms of the number of loans 
participated during a year t. In column (3), X is Diversified participant, which identifies those lead 
arrangers who are in the top quartile in terms of the number of distinct lead arrangers with which they 
syndicated loans during year t. I control for lead arranger–participant and year fixed effects in each case. 
Standard errors are robust in all specifications and clustered at the lead arranger-participant level. 
 
Log(1 + loans together) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
X = 1 X = Large participant 
X = Diversified 
participant   
Default event t-1 x Xt-1 (β1) 
0.04 ***     
(10.10) 
0.38 ***     
(41.78) 
0.15 ***     
(14.09) 
Default event t-1 x [1- Xt-1 (β2)]  
-0.08 ***     
(-23.44) 
0.01 ***     
(2.79) 
    
Log(Loans by lead t-1) 
0.04 ***     
(65.90) 
0.04 ***     
(66.15) 
0.04 ***     
(66.13) 
ROA, lead t-1  
0.03 ***     
(11.32) 
0.03 ***     
(10.75) 
0.03 ***     
(11.30) 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio, lead t-1 
0.01 ***     
(3.59) 
0.01 ***     
(3.78) 
0.01 ***     
(3.58) 
Capital adequacy ratio, lead t-1 
0.00 ***     
(-4.53) 
0.00 ***     
(-4.91) 
0.00 ***     
(-4.53) 
Log(Total assets, lead) t-1 
0.05 ***     
(7.89) 
0.05 ***     
(9.36) 
0.05 ***     
(8.37) 
    
Obs. 300,940 300,940 300,940 
R2 0.04 0.07 0.05 
Specification OLS OLS OLS 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pair Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
The evidence from the Table 7 suggests that events of default generally increase lead 
arranger’s ability to attract participants. The coefficient on Default event in column (1) 
indicates an increase in activity between lead arranger and a given participant. This does not 
support the hypothesis H1, according to which loss in reputation would damage the lead 
arranger’s ability to attract participants.  
The results from column (2) imply that the increase in activity is limited to participants 
which are in the top quartile in terms of loans they participated the previous year. Further, 
the evidence suggests that default events decrease lead arrangers with participants that are 
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not in the top quartile in terms of the amount of loans they participated in the previous year. 
Both results are statistically significant at 1% level.  
This suggests that lead arrangers are unable to attract smaller participants after suffering a 
loss in reputation. In turn they rely on the larger, more experienced participants in their 
syndicates. Larger participants and lead arrangers might have an established relationship, 
and therefore events of default might not change their perception of lead arrangers’ ability 
to provide diligent screening and monitoring. Small participants on the other hand might not 
have prior experience on the lead arranger and therefore their perception of the lead 
arranger’s reputation as a diligent monitor might suffer more easily. 
These findings are supported by the results from column (3), which suggests that lead 
arrangers increase their activity with diversified participants. Although the coefficient is 
positive for both diversified participants and non-diversified, the increase is significantly 
larger if the participant is considered diversified. Both results are significant at 1% level. 
The higher degree of diversification can suggest increased likelihood that the participant 
and lead arranger have had prior relationship.  
The results differ from the ones observed by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011), who 
found that bankruptcy filings decrease the willingness of large and diversified participants 
to attend syndicates by lead arranger. My results suggest the exact opposite, and that large 
and diversified participants are in fact more likely to attend a syndicate after default event.  
This can be caused by two different reasons. Firstly, this difference in findings could 
highlight a fundamental difference between European and Northern American loan 
syndication markets. My results suggest that participants operating in the European loan 
markets do not alter their perception of lead arrangers’ monitoring ability based on events 
of default.  
Secondly, it might be that a single Default event is not considered as harmful in European 
loan markets compared to that in the USA. My data on defaults considers a wider range of 
events of default compared to the study by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011) who 
solely concentrated on Chapter 11 filings. It might be that market actors do not consider 
missed payments as harmful for the lead arranger’s reputation, and therefore are not 
discouraged to attend subsequent syndicates.   
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4.2.4. Borrower characteristics 
In this section I examine how default events affect the types of borrowers the lead arranger 
lends to the subsequent year. My previous findings suggest that lead arrangers become more 
risk averse after experiencing Default event. I find that they retain a smaller share of the 
loans they syndicate, effectively reducing exposure to a single lender, all other things being 
equal. In order to gain a more insight on whether the defaults really increase risk aversion or 
not, I investigate if default events cause lead arrangers to lend to less riskier clients in the 
future.  
Since large multinational banks may have separate lending functions in each country, I also 
investigate how country specific defaults affect the borrower characteristics. If lenders 
switch to less riskier borrowers after experiencing a default, it might only be restricted to 
the country where the default originally took place.   
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Table 10 – Borrower characteristics 
This table reports the results of regressions investigating the impact on loss of reputation on the type of 
borrowers that the lead arranger lends to in the subsequent year. I estimate OLS regressions of the 
following form: 
The dependent variable is Log(Total assets) in columns (1) and (2), Debt to assets in columns (3) and (4) 
and EV to book value in columns (4) and (5). I include lead arranger and year fixed effects in all 
regressions. Standard are robust and clustered at the individual lead arranger level.  
                  
 
Log(Total assets) 
 
Debt to Assets 
 
EV to book value 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Default event t-1 
0.03  
(0.85)   
0.01   
(1.36)   
-0.47 ** 
(-2.08)  
Country default t-1  
-0.35 ***   
(-5.53)   
-0.01 **  
(-2.18)   
0.33 
(1.38) 
         
Log(Loan amount) 
0.62 ***  
(27.53) 
0.62 ***  
(28.64)  
0.00 ***  
(-2.56) 
0.00 ***  
(-2.57)  
0.18 ***  
(2.84) 
0.18 ***  
(2.83) 
Years to maturity 
0.04 ***  
(6.99) 
0.04 ***  
(7.19)  
0.00 ***   
(2.65) 
0.00 ***   
(2.56)  
0.00    
(-0.14) 
0.00    
(-0.11) 
Acquisition Financing -dummy 
-0.17 ***  
(-3.59) 
-0.17 ***  
(-3.67)  
-0.02 ***  
(-5.46) 
-0.02 ***  
(-5.39)  
0.07   
(0.37) 
0.07   
(0.40) 
Refinancing -dummy 
-0.04   
(-1.51) 
-0.03   
(-1.19)  
0.02 ***   
(4.82) 
0.02 ***   
(4.94)  
-0.44 **   
(-2.43) 
-0.45 **   
(-2.45) 
Working Capital -dummy 
-0.07 *  
(-2.01) 
-0.07 *  
(-1.92)  
-0.01 ***  
(-3.30) 
-0.01 ***  
(-3.29)  
1.28 ***  
(4.54) 
1.28 ***  
(4.55) 
         
Log(Total assets, borrower) t-1     
0.01 ***  
(7.80) 
0.01 ***  
(7.84)  
-0.09   
(-1.54) 
-0.09   
(-1.51) 
EV to Book Value, borrower t-1 
0.00   
(-1.40) 
0.00   
(-1.39)  
0.00 ***   
(3.86) 
0.00 ***   
(3.86)    
Debt to Assets, borrower t-1 
1.10 ***   
(7.33) 
1.08 ***   
(7.37)     
16.44 ***    
(17.94) 
16.44 ***    
(17.96) 
ROA, borrower t-1 
-0.01 **   
(-2.44) 
-0.01 ***   
(-2.61)  
-0.01 ***   
(-16.16) 
-0.01 ***   
(-16.17)  
0.09 ***   
(4.52) 
0.09 ***   
(4.57) 
Log(Loans by lead t-1) 
0.00   
(0.65) 
0.00   
(0.73)  
0.00 ***    
(0.12) 
0.00 ***    
(0.31)  
0.00     
(-1.31) 
0.00     
(-1.45) 
  
        
Tier 1 Capital Ratio, lead t-1 
0.01    
(0.63) 
0.01    
(0.79)  
0.00    
(0.65) 
0.00    
(0.62)  
-0.05    
(-0.40) 
-0.04    
(-0.30) 
Capital adequacy ratio, lead t-1 
-0.01    
(-0.55) 
-0.01    
(-0.52)  
0.00    
(-0.65) 
0.00    
(-0.56)  
0.07    
(0.77) 
0.06    
(0.58) 
ROA, lead t-1  
0.05     
(1.20) 
0.04     
(1.00)  
0.00     
(-0.15) 
0.00     
(-0.24)  
-0.13    
(-0.44) 
-0.11    
(-0.39) 
Log(Total assets, lead) t-1 
0.07     
(0.67) 
0.12     
(1.00)  
0.01     
(1.00) 
0.01     
(1.25)  
0.71     
(1.71) 
0.62     
(1.03) 
         
Obs. 30,719 30,719   30,719 30,719   30,719 30,719 
R2 0.31 0.31   0.11 0.11   0.04 0.04 
Specification OLS OLS   OLS OLS   OLS OLS 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Lender Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                 
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Based on the results on Table 8, I find mixed support for the earlier findings on increased 
risk aversion. The regression results from columns (1) and (2) describe how default events 
affect the size of the borrower. Size is considered as a proxy for information asymmetry, 
and it is assumed that defaults lead to borrowers concentrating on larger borrower whose 
information is more readily available.   
Based on the results from columns (1) and (2), the variable Default event has no statistically 
significant effect on the size of the borrower. However, the column (2) suggests that the 
variable Country default has statistically significant negative effect on the borrower size. 
This suggests that lead arrangers lend to smaller borrowers if they have experienced default 
event in the same country during the previous year. This is in accordance with the findings 
by Gopalan, Nanda and Yerramilli (2011), who found that bankruptcy filings cause lenders 
to lend to smaller customers.  
Furthermore, the results provide support for the argument that large banks are segmented 
according to different countries. According to hypothesis H6, events of default can have an 
adverse effect on the lending capacity of financial institutions due to loss of internal 
reputation or decrease in capital. The fact that only defaults in the same country have an 
adverse effect on lending capacity provides evidence of segmentation by countries.  
Similar, albeit weaker, evidence lower risk appetite is seen from the results in columns (3) 
and (4), where the variable Country default has an adverse impact on the leverage of the 
borrowing firm. In other words, lead arrangers tend to arrange loans to firms with lower 
leverage after having experienced an event of default in the same country in the previous 
year. The effect is statistically significant at 5% level. Based on the findings in column (3), 
events of default do not cause change in the borrower’s leverage.  
In columns (5) and (6) I investigate if default events decrease lead arranges’ willingness to 
provide financing to growth firms. I use ratio of enterprise value to book value as a proxy 
for growth opportunities. Firms with higher values are considered growth firms. As growth 
firms can be considered riskier, a decrease in risk appetite will decrease lending to these 
firms. The negative and significant coefficient in column (5) suggests that lead arrangers are 
less likely to growth firms following events of default. The effect is statistically significant 
at 5% level. This finding supports the earlier indications that lead arrangers become more 
risk averse after defaults. Based on the results, the variable Country default does not cause 
similar reduction.  
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Overall, the evidence from table 8 suggests that at a country level, lead arrangers are more 
likely to lend to less riskier borrowers following events of default. These findings support 
the findings from chapter 4.1 where I found lead arrangers to retain a smaller portion of the 
loans they syndicate following a default.  
4.3. Lender-borrower distance and the role of reputation 
In order to investigate if the reputational consequences of default events increase with 
lender-borrower distance, I construct new variable Market distance. The variable is 
designed to encompass the cultural, informational and regulatory barriers between the 
lenders and borrowers in European loan market. Geographical distance alone might not 
encompass the barriers effectively, since the distance between different countries in Europe 
vary significantly.  
The variable Market distance gets the value of 1 if the lender and borrower have the same 
country of domicile, value of 2 if they are neighbouring countries, value of 3 if they are not 
neighbouring countries and value of 4 if the lender’s domicile is outside Europe. The range 
thus ranges from 1 to 4, with higher score illustrating higher information asymmetries. 
Rather than relying on geographical distance for a proxy of informational asymmetries, my 
measure is based on regional proximity. According to Fidrmuc and Hainz (2012) European 
loan markets have integrated regionally, leading to lower informational and regulatory 
barriers. On the other hand, financial institutions located outside the Europe might have 
informational disadvantage relative to their European competitors.  
To study if the consequences of default events increase in distance, I construct a new 
interaction variable Market distance x Default event t-1 which gets values from 1 to 4 if the 
lead arranger has experienced defaults events in t-1, and 0 otherwise.  
As an alternative measure of information asymmetries between lender and borrower, I use 
the geographical distance in kilometres between their respective domiciles’ capitals. The 
measure has been widely used to proxy informational asymmetries (see e.g. (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999)). Although the measure is rather rough and does not take into account the 
regional integration, it is still widely used in many prominent studies. Due to the many non-
European institution involved, the variable is fairly skewed. To control for this, I use the 
natural logarithm of the variable in the regressions.  
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In order to study the interaction between the geographical distance and defaults, I construct 
a new interaction variable Log(Distance in km) x Default events t-1.  
In table 11 I use Lead allocation and Number of MLAs as dependent variables and the two 
distance proxies as independent variables. Control variables are the same as in the previous 
regressions.  
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Table 11 – Effect of lender-borrower distance 
Table 11 reports results on the interaction between lender-borrower distance and default events. As the 
independent variable I study the interaction between Default events and two different distance measures. 
As a dependent variable I use Lead allocation and Number of MLAs. I control for year fixed effects in all 
regressions. Additionally, I control borrower fixed effects in columns (1) and (2) and lender fixed effects 
in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors are robust in all specifications and clustered at the lead or 
borrower level. 
            
 
Lead allocation (%) 
 
# of MLAs in a syndicate 
  (1) (2)  
(3) (4) 
Default event t-1 
-0.96 ***  
(-3.17) 
-0.96 ***  
(-3.16)  
-0.55 *  
(-1.82) 
-1.61 **  
(-2.43) 
Market distance -dummy 
-0.09  
(-0.74)   
0.91 ***  
(11.03)  
Market distance x Default event t-1 
0.12  
(0.95)   
0.23 **  
(2.28)  
Log(Distance in km) 
 
-0.01  
(-0.10)   
0.90 ***  
(10.24) 
Log(Distance in km) x Default event t-1 
 
0.02  
(0.51)   
0.24 ***  
(2.70) 
      
Log(Loan amount) 
-0.09  
(-0.16) 
-0.07  
(-0.13)  
1.62 ***  
(24.45) 
1.63 ***  
(25.05) 
Years to maturity 
1.19 ***  
(3.22) 
1.19 ***  
(3.22)  
-0.03 ***  
(-2.48) 
-0.03 **  
(-2.12) 
Number of participants   
-0.28 ***  
(-3.36) 
-0.28 ***  
(-3.36)  
-0.03 ***  
(-5.52) 
-0.03 ***  
(-5.55) 
Acquisition Financing -dummy 
4.01   
(1.41) 
4.02   
(1.41)  
0.20   
(1.51) 
0.22   
(1.71) 
Refinancing –dummy 
-3.44 **   
(-2.27) 
-3.44 **   
(-2.27)  
-0.05    
(-0.55) 
-0.06    
(-0.65) 
Working Capital -dummy 
-7.77 ***   
(-3.91) 
-7.78 ***   
(-3.91)  
-1.03 ***   
(-10.58) 
-1.04 ***   
(-10.41) 
Syndicate 
-74.20 ***   
(-13.04) 
-74.24 ***   
(-13.09)    
      
Log(Total assets, borrower) t-1  
-2.02    
(-1.04) 
-2.01    
(-1.04)  
0.68 ***    
(19.08) 
0.69 ***    
(19.06) 
EV to Book Value, borrower t-1 
0.30 *   
(1.72) 
0.30 *   
(1.72)  
0.00 **   
(-2.38) 
0.00 **   
(-2.03) 
Debt to Assets, borrower t-1 
-22.42 ***   
(-2.71) 
-22.30 ***   
(-2.69)  
-0.22    
(-0.57) 
-0.34    
(-0.91) 
Log(Loans by lead t-1) 
0.49 ***   
(3.51) 
0.50 ***   
(3.51)  
-0.13 ***    
(-2.78) 
-0.13 ***    
(-2.77) 
  
     
Tier 1 Capital Ratio, lead t-1 
-0.23    
(-1.37) 
-0.23    
(-1.38) 
  
-0.01    
(-0.19) 
-0.02    
(-0.21) 
Capital adequacy ratio, lead t-1 
0.31 ***    
(3.21) 
0.31 ***    
(3.22) 
  
-0.03     
(-0.44) 
-0.03     
(-0.44) 
ROA, lead t-1  
0.11     
(0.39) 
0.12     
(0.43)  
0.27     
(1.90) 
0.29 **     
(2.13) 
Log(Total assets, lead) t-1 
-0.21     
(-1.22) 
-0.22     
(-1.27)  
-0.51 *     
(-1.87) 
-0.39     
(-1.52) 
      
Obs. 2480 2480 
 
30719 30719 
R2 0.56 0.56 
 
0.37 0.37 
Specification OLS OLS 
 
OLS OLS 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Borrower / Lender Fixed Effects Borrower Borrower 
 
Lender Lender 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results from columns (1) and (2) show that the interaction terms between Default event 
and the distance dummies are statistically insignificant. This suggests that changes in 
lender-borrower distance do not have an effect on the Lead allocation.  
According to the hypothesis H5, increase in lender-borrower distance reinforces the 
reputational consequence. However, based on my earlier findings, shock in reputation 
caused by Default event does not cause lead arrangers to signal better monitoring quality. 
Since defaults cause no reputational effects on Lead allocation, the increase in lender-
borrower distance should not have an effect.   
According to the results from columns (3) and (4), increase in the lender-borrower distance 
causes lead arrangers to have more co-leads if they experienced Default event the previous 
year. In column (3) the interaction variable is positive and statistically significant at 5% 
level. In column (4), the interaction variable is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level. 
The findings provide strong support for the H5, which states that increase in information 
asymmetries measured by distance proxies reinforces the reputational consequences. 
Statistically, the most significant measure of information asymmetries is the Log(Distance 
in km).  
Overall, the results in Table 11 provide a clear picture on how the lender-borrower distance 
and default events interact. In the subsequent syndications, lead arrangers have more 
emphasis on monitoring and the effect is also increasing in distance. As the distance and 
information asymmetries grow, the lead arranger wants to mitigate them by having 
additional lead arrangers who will share part of the screening and monitoring.  
4.4. Robustness tests 
The underlying proposition in my research is that after including control variables for 
borrower, loan and lead arranger and after controlling borrower and year fixed effect, the 
effects of Default event is exogenous. This assumption allows me to interpret my findings to 
arise from the loss of reputation following the default events. However, in this section I 
consider few alternative explanations and tests to rule them out.   
Does the Default event dummy selectively identify those lead arrangers that lend to risky 
firms? 
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If the variable Default event would identify those lead arrangers that consistently lend to 
risky firms, the lead arranger is likely to consistently retain a lower allocation of the loan it 
syndicates. In other words, my results are biased if the Default event recognises lead 
arrangers that always retain a lower share of the loans they syndicate.  
In order to control for this possibility, I construct a new variable, Pre-default event, a 
dummy variable identifying lead arrangers the year before they experience a default event. 
If the variable Default event recognises lenders that always retain a lower share of the loans 
they syndicate, the coefficient for the variable Pre-default event should be negative and 
statistically significant.  
Does the Default event dummy identify difficult credit market conditions, which force lead 
arrangers to lower their exposure? 
Based on the summary statistics in Table 1, the vast majority of all default events occurred 
in the recession year 2009. This means the occurrences of the variable Default event 
identify the year 2009. If the recession year causes the lead arrangers to become more risk 
averse and lower their exposure to the loan markets, the interpretation of my results can be 
wrong. 
In order to control for this possibility, I construct a new dummy variable, Default in 
recession, which identifies default events that occurred during the recession years 2001 and 
2009. Additionally, I construct dummy variable, Default in normal which identifies defaults 
that occurred in normal credit market conditions. 
Should my results be caused by the lower risk appetite following recession years, the 
variable for Default in recession should be statistically significant and negative, while the 
Default in normal should be insignificant.  
Table 12 reports the results from these specifications. 
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Table 12 – Robustness tests 
Table 12 reports the results from the robustness tests. The dependent variable is Lead allocation in all 
cases. The independent variable in column (1) is Pre-default event, a dummy variable identifying lead 
arrangers a year before they experience default events. In columns (2) and (3) I investigate how the credit 
market conditions affect the Lead allocation. The independent variable in column (2) is Default in 
recession¸ a dummy variable identifying defaults that occur during recession years 2001 and 2009. The 
dependent variable in column (3) is Default in normal, identifying defaults that occur during normal 
credit market conditions.  The control variables are same as in the Table 3, but they are suppressed for 
brevity. I control borrower fixed effects and year fixed effects in all cases. Standard errors are robust in 
all specifications and clustered at the borrower level. 
 
Lead allocation (%) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pre-default event 
-0.30  
(-1.24)   
Default in recession 
 
0.22  
(0.20)  
Default in normal 
  
-1.05 ***  
(-3.04) 
    
Obs. 2480 2480 2480 
R2 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Specification OLS OLS OLS 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
According to the results from column (1), the variable Pre-default event has no statistically 
significant effect on the Lead allocation. This suggests that the earlier effects of default 
event are not caused by selection bias. Instead, the result here provides further 
reinforcement to my findings suggesting that the lead arrangers become more risk-averse in 
their loan syndicates following a default event.  
The finding from column (1) is in accordance with the results by Gopalan, Nanda and 
Yerramilli (2011), who also found that the signalling effect discovered in the US loan 
syndication market is not a product of selection bias. Instead, these finding supports the 
notion that financial intermediaries act differently in European markets than in the US 
markets. 
The findings from columns (2) and (3) imply that the negative effect of the Default events is 
only caused by those defaults that do not occur during recession. The variable Default in 
recession in column (2) is statistically insignificant, while the coefficient in column (3) is 
negative and significant at 1% level. This suggests that while the majority of default events 
in my data occur during recession years, they do not have an impact on the Lead allocation. 
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This finding provides additional robustness to my findings as the increase in risk awareness 
is not caused by credit market conditions.   
Besides specific robustness tests, in Table 3 I run the regression controlling both borrower 
and lender fixed effects separately, in addition to year fixed effects. Further, in appendix I 
include results from regression where I control for borrower and lender fixed effects. The 
results from all these regressions imply that default events have statistically significant and 
negative impact on lead allocation.  
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
The empirical section of this thesis finds partially contradictory results compared to the 
earlier research. Earlier studies found that Chapter 11 filings cause lead arrangers signal 
better monitoring quality by retaining larger fraction on the subsequent loans they 
syndicate. My findings suggest that shocks to lead arrangers’ reputation caused by borrower 
defaults do not cause reputational consequences in European loan markets. On the contrary, 
I find evidence that lead arrangers decrease their exposure to a single borrower by 
decreasing their future commitments after one of their borrower defaults. However, after 
investigating the effect regionally, I find that the reputational hypothesis holds for Nordic 
lead arrangers and they retain larger fraction of future loans after their borrower defaults.  
I am also able to establish a connection between reputational consequences and the share of 
foreign participants. I find that lead arrangers’ propensity to signal better borrowing quality 
is dependent partially on the share of foreign participants in future syndicates. My findings 
complement previous studies and suggest that the perception of foreign participants on lead 
arranger’s monitoring ability is easily eroded. Lead arrangers acknowledge this and try to 
mitigate the loss of reputation by retaining larger share of the subsequent loans.       
I also find that the non-dominant lead arrangers signal better monitoring quality by 
including additional co-lead arrangers after experiencing shocks to their reputation. 
Furthermore, lead arrangers also have additional lead arrangers in their syndicates as the 
lender-borrower distance increases. This suggests that as the information asymmetries grow 
in lender-borrower distances, banks have greater incentive to include additional lead 
arrangers in the syndicate.  
Finally, I find that lead arrangers ability to attract small participants in terms of syndication 
volume after experiencing Default event. Instead, the lead arrangers seem to switch to larger 
participants in their future syndicates. This suggests that perceived reputation loss is greater 
with small participants that are not active in syndication markets.  
Table 13 summarises the main findings of my thesis. 
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Table 13 – Summary of the results 
This table summarises the hypotheses and main findings related to them. 
  Hypotheses  
Empirical evidence 
    
H1 If the reputation of the lead arranger suffers from 
defaults or distressed restructurings, the lead 
arranger will retain a larger portion of the loans 
after default events by lead arranger’s borrowers. 
 
Medium support.  Default events cause lead arrangers to 
retain a smaller portion of subsequent loans they 
syndicate. The effect is significant at 1% level. However, 
the signalling propensity by lead arranger is affected by 
the share of foreign participants in the syndicate. As the 
share of foreign participants increase, the lead arrangers 
will retain larger portion of the loan. The effect is 
statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
H2 If the reputation of the lead arranger suffers from 
defaults or distressed restructurings, the lead 
arranger will have fewer participants in its future 
syndicates and its ability to attract participants to 
its syndicates is worsened. 
 
Medium support.  Default events have no statistically 
significant effect on the number of participants in a 
syndicate. However, I find that lead arrangers ability to 
attract small participants is damaged after experiencing 
shock to reputation. Instead, the lead arrangers seem to 
switch to larger participants in their future syndicates. The 
effect is statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
H3 If the reputation of the lead arranger suffers from 
defaults or distressed restructurings, the lead 
arranger will try to mitigate the loss of reputation 
by having additional lead arrangers in its 
subsequent syndicates. 
 
Medium support.  According to my results, non-
dominant lead arrangers will have more co-leads 
following a default event. I also find that as the lender-
borrower distance increases, lead arrangers signal better 
monitoring quality by including additional co-lead 
arrangers after experiencing shocks to their reputation. 
The effect is statistically significant at 1% level. 
 
H4 Lead arrangers’ propensity to signal better 
monitoring quality after shock to its reputation is 
related to the amount of foreign participants in the 
syndicate. 
 
Strong support.  My results suggest that as the share of 
foreign participants in a syndicate increases, the lead 
arranger will signal better monitoring quality by retaining 
a larger share of the loan. The effect is statistically 
significant at 1% level. 
 
H5 Increase in the lender-borrower distance reinforces 
the reputational consequences of default events. 
 
Medium support.  The number of additional co-leads in a 
syndicate following default event is affected by the 
lender-borrower distance. The number of additional co-
lead arrangers is increasing in distance. The effect is 
statistically significant at 1% level. 
H6 If default events erode the lead arranger’s capital 
base or damage the internal reputation, it will 
retain a lower share of future syndications 
following default event. 
  
Strong support.  My results imply that lead arrangers will 
retain less of the loans they syndicate after their borrower 
experiences a default event. This suggests that default 
events damage the lead arrangers' capital base or internal 
reputation. Alternatively the result can imply increase in 
risk aversion. 
 
 
5.1. Suggestions for further research 
This master’s thesis fills an important gap in the literature by investigating the role of 
reputation in the European loan syndication markets. My findings are both economically 
and statistically significant, and they help to understand how reputational consequences 
work in cross-border lending. 
Despite the contribution of the thesis, there remain avenues for further research. The most 
interesting topic for future research would include further investigate how the lead 
arranger’s propensity to signal varies according to different circumstances. Based on my 
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findings, lead arrangers are opportunistic and use the signalling option only when it is 
needed. Furthermore, although default events clearly represent an important determinant of 
lead arrangers’ reputation, there are other aspects that should be considered. An interesting 
venue for further research would be to investigate how other factors affect lead arrangers’ 
reputation.  
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7. Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Variable definitions 
 
Lead arranger characteristics: 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio The financial institution’s core equity capital divided by its 
total risk-weighted assets. 
Capital adequacy ratio Capital adequacy ratio is a measure of the amount of a bank's 
core capital expressed as a percentage of its risk-weighted 
asset. 
Log(Total assets) The natural logarithm of the book value of assets. 
ROA  The ratio of earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes 
(EBITDA) to total assets. 
Default event Dummy variable that identifies lead arranger who has lent to a 
borrower that has experienced payment default, bankruptcy or 
distressed restructuring.  Default data has been obtained from 
Leveraged Commentary & Data portal by Standard & Poor’s. 
Restructuring Dummy variable that identifies lead arranger who has lent to a 
borrower that has experienced a distressed restructuring or 
filed for bankruptcy. 
Default Dummy variable that identifies lead arranger who has lent to a 
borrower that has a missed payment of interest and/or 
principal. 
Country default Dummy variable that identifies lead arranger who has lent to a 
borrower that has experienced a Default event. The dummy 
variable takes the value one if the borrower experiencing the 
default has the same domicile as the new borrower.  
Market distance Variable measuring the lender-borrower distance. The variable 
takes value one if the lender and borrower have the same 
domicile, value two if they are domiciled in neighbouring 
countries, value three if they are domiciled in Europe but not 
neighbours and four if the lender is domiciled outside Europe.  
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Log(Distance in kms) Logarithm of the geographical distance between the capitals of 
lender’s and borrower’s respective domiciles. 
Dominant lead Dummy variable identifying those lead arrangers whose 
number of loan syndicated is above country’s average in a 
specific year. 
Non-dominant lead Dummy variable identifying those lead arrangers whose 
number of loan syndicated is below country’s average in a 
specific year. 
Log(Lead size) Logarithm of the average annual amount syndicated by the 
lead arranger over the past 2 years. 
Log(Loans by lead) Logarithm of the number of deals syndicated by lead arranger 
the previous year.  
 
Loan characteristics: 
Lead allocation: The percentage of the loan financed by the lead arranger. 
Number of participants The number of participants in a syndicate. 
Number of MLAs The number of mandated lead arrangers in a syndicate. 
Log(Loan size) The natural logarithm of the total size of the loan in $ million. 
Acquisition financing -
dummy 
Dummy variable that identify if the main purpose of the loan is 
to finance a takeover, LBO or a merger. 
Refinancing –dummy Dummy variable that identify if the main purpose of the loan is 
to refinancing. 
Working capital -dummy Dummy variable that identify if the main purpose of the loan is 
to finance working capital. 
 
Borrower characteristics: 
Log(Total assets) The natural logarithm of the book value of assets. 
EV to book value The ratio of enterprise value to book value.  
Debt to assets The ratio of interest bearing debt to total assets.  
ROA The ratio of earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes 
(EBITDA) to total assets. 
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Appendix 2 – Percentage of the loan retained by lead arranger 
This table reports the results of the regression investigating whether default events have impact on the 
percentage of loan retained by the lead arranger. In all columns, I estimate the regression of the form: 
                                                                     
The dependent variable in column (1) is Default event, Restructuring in column (2) and Default in column 
(3). The regressions in columns (1) – (3) are controlled for borrower fixed effects and the regressions in 
column (4) – (6) for lender fixed effects. I control for year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard 
errors are robust in all specifications and clustered at the borrower or lead arranger level. 
  Lead allocation (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Default event t-1 
-1.02 ** 
(-2.19) 
    
Restructuring t-1   
-1.32 *** 
(-2.56) 
  
Default  t-1     
-0.79 * 
(-1.76) 
 
      
Log(Loan amount) 
-0.01  
(-0.03) 
-0.02  
(-0.04) 
0.021 
(0.02) 
Years to maturity 
1.03 *** 
(2.71) 
1.01 *** 
(2.68) 
1.03 *** 
(2.71) 
Number of MLAs 
-0.42 *** 
(-2.73) 
-0.42 *** 
(-2.71) 
-0.43 *** 
(-2.71) 
Number of participants 
-0.44 *** 
(-3.74) 
-0.43 *** 
(-3.74) 
-0.43 *** 
(-3.73) 
Acquisition Financing -dummy 
1.32 
(0.52) 
1.24 
(0.50) 
1.25 
(0.49) 
Refinancing -dummy 
-4.06 *** 
(-2.57) 
-4.04 *** 
(-2.57) 
-4.09 *** 
(-2.57) 
Working Capital -dummy 
-3.99 ** 
(-2.07) 
-3.94 ** 
(-2.07) 
-3.98 ** 
(-2.05) 
Syndicate 
-72.26 *** 
(-14.47) 
-72.55 *** 
(-14.68) 
-72.19 *** 
(-14.18) 
 
      
Log(Total assets, borrower) t-1  
-1.79 
(-0.73) 
-1.80 
(-0.74) 
-1.79 
(-0.73) 
EV to Book Value, borrower t-1 
0.39 *  
(1.90) 
0.38 *  
(1.89) 
0.39 *  
(1.90) 
Debt to Assets, borrower t-1 
-28.07 *** 
(-2.47) 
-28.13 *** 
(-2.50) 
-28.01 *** 
(-2.46) 
Log(Lead size) t-1 
0.23   
(1.18) 
0.21   
(1.10) 
0.24   
(1.27) 
 
      
Tier 1 Capital Ratio, lead t-1 
0.01  
(0.06) 
-0.05  
(-0.21) 
-0.01  
(0.05) 
Capital adequacy ratio, lead t-1 
0.06   
(0.32) 
0.07   
(0.38) 
0.02   
(0.10) 
ROA, lead t-1  
0.28   
(0.29) 
0.34   
(0.36) 
0.28   
(0.29) 
Log(Total assets, lead) t-1 
-3.34 *  
(-1.80) 
-3.55 *  
(-1.86) 
-3.29 *  
(-1.75) 
 
      
Obs. 2480 2480 2480 
R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Specification OLS OLS OLS 
Borrower, Lender and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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